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NOTE
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND THE FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
FOUNDATION OF THE AMENDED
NATIONAL SECURITY
EXEMPTION
The 1974 amendments' to the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA),2 which were intended to overrule the Supreme Court decision
in EPA v. Mink,' permit in camera judicial inspection of classified
documents to determine the propriety of classification and to segregate
nonsecret portions for release. President Ford vetoed the bill,4 in large
part because he believed the amendments unconstitutional. 5 The Presi-
dent's veto, shortly overridden by Congress, focused on the requirement
that the executive branch assume the burden of proving that classifica-
tion was more reasonable than release.' Respectable authorities have
asserted that the revised national security exemption 7 unconstitutionally
trespasses on the exclusive constitutional domain of the President.8
Specifically, these critics contend that classification of national security
information is an inherently presidential function, in which neither
Congress nor the courts may intrude. A necessary corollary to this
contention is that the Constitution grants to the President an absolute,
unreviewable privilege to withhold any documents whose release would
injure the national security.'
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. IV 1974).
2. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970) (amended 1974).
3. 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
4. 10 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1318 (1974).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1974).
8. See notes 179-89 infra and accompanying text.
9. The phrase "national security" is of relatively recent origin and no little
ambiguity. See Note, National Security and the Amended Freedom of Information Act,
85 YALE L.J. 401, 409-15 (1976). It first gained currency in 1947 with the passage of
the National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 401-06 (1970), which established the National
Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency. The purpose was "to provide a
comprehensive program for the future security of the United States." Id. § 401.
Sander Vanocur, in a speech at Northwestern University on June 30, 1973, character-
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This Note will examine the constitutional foundation of the 1974
FOTA amendments relating to the national security exemption. Section
I will outline the administrative procedures required by the FOIA, the
reasons for enacting it, and the legal background to the 1974 amend-
ments. Section II will discuss the state secrets privilege in the common
law of evidence and suggest that this legal doctrine also has guided
courts in developing a constitutionally based executive privilege. Sec-
tion III will consider the President's constitutional privilege to refuse
disclosure of confidential advice of his subordinates and the Supreme
Court's recent construction of that privilege in United States v. Nixon."0
Section IV will consider the constitutional foundation of an exclusively
executive national security privilege. This section will examine the
assertion that the Constitution grants the President absolute, unreview-
able discretion to conduct American foreign policy, and its corollary that
such power extends to directly related domestic activity. Section V will
discuss judicial ability to review national security classifications under
the political question doctrine.
This Note will argue that the executive branch faces an inherent
conflict of interest in attempting to reach the delicate balance between
openness and secrecy. Thus, the Constitution permits final judicial
determination of the propriety of secrecy whenever the executive's con-
flict of interest reaches sufficient magnitude. The necessary magnitude
will vary with the need for secrecy, the consequences of nondisclosure,
and the constitutional allocation of the initial decisionmaking authority.
With narrow exceptions this theory supports the 1974 FOIA amend-
ments as a constitutionally permissible use of Congress' concurrent
powers in foreign affairs.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Freedom of Information Act requires federal agencies to make
available identifiable records on request from any member of the pub-
lie." If the agency fails to comply, the citizen may seek injunctive relief
ized the term "national security" as a "golden calf," the idolatrous worship of which
had led the United States into both Vietnam and Watergate. Regardless of the disre-
pute into which the term has fallen in the popular press, national security does embody
essential public interests. See notes 24-27 infra and accompanying text.
10. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
11. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1974). The original FOIA required a request
for "identifiable records." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3) (1970) (amended 1974). The 1974
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from the federal district courts, which have original jurisdiction to
conduct a hearing de novo with priority on the docket."2 The agency
bears the burden of justifying its refusal.' 3 Unless the agency can
establish that the information is exempt from disclosure under one of
nine statutory exceptions, 14 each to be construed narrowly, 15 the citizen
must prevail.'
amendments merely require that the request "reasonably describ[e] such records." 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (Supp. IV 1974).
12. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970) (amended 1974).
13. Id.
14. This section does not apply to matters that are-
(1 ) specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest
of national defense or foreign policy;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a
person and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not
be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the
extent available by law to a party other than an agency;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating or condition reports
prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regu-
lation or supervision of financial institutions; or
(9) geological or geophysical information and data, including maps, con-
cerning wells.
Id. § 552(b) (amended 1974).
15. Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Vaughn v. Rosen, 484
F.2d 820, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA,
478 F.2d 47, 49 (4th Cir. 1973); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1080 (D.C. Cir.
1971); Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 25 (4th Cir. 1971); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC,
424 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
16. Subsection (c) was explicit: "This section does not authorize withholding of
information or limit the availability of records to the public, except as specifically stated
in this section." 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1970) (amended 1974).
Whether Congress intended to deprive the courts of general equitable powers to
exempt material not specifically within the nine exemptions is an open question.
Compare Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 677-80 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (courts lack
equitable power to exempt material not specifically exempted by Congress; contrary
result would upset delicate balance desired by Congress), and Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d
1067, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (same), with Theriault v. United States, 395 F. Supp. 637,
641 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (court retains equity power to weigh public benefit of disclosure).
Cf. Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 17 (1942) (courts retain power to
stay administrative orders absent explicit congressional denial). See generally Renego-
tiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing, Inc., 415 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1974) (dictum that courts
retain equity powers absent explicit congressional denial); Rose v. Department of Air
Force, 495 F.2d 261, 269 (2d Cir. 1974), afI'd, 96 S. Ct. 1592 (1976); Note, The
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The FOIA was intended to increase governmental accountability to
the electorate." Congress recognized that only an informed electorate
is capable of intelligent decisions;' 8 absent basic knowledge of govern-
ment policies democracy functions poorly.'0 The FOIA is potentially
capable of serving more tangible if no less important interests. As
presidential power has increased, public information has become essen-
tial to insure a rational decisionmaking process within the executive
branch. Despite lipservice to the value of candid advice and open
debate, the modern imperial Presidency has developed a closeminded
"yes-man" mentality.2 0  By allowing greater access to information, the
Freedom of Information Act: A Seven Year Assessment, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 895, 912-
20 (1974); Project, Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MICH. L.
REv. 971, 1150-56 (1975).
17. H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2418; S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); 2 WEEKLY
COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 895 (1966). See also New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713, 720 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring); Committee on Civil Rights, Executive
Privilege: Analysis and Recommendations for Congressional Legislation, 29 REC. N.Y.
CITY B.A. 177 (1974); Note, In Canera Inspection Under the Freedom of Information
Act, 41 U. Cm. L. REv. 557, 564-66 (1974); Comment, Judicial Review of Classified
Documents: Amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, 12 HARV. J. LEols. 415
(1975).
18. H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in [1966] U.S. CoDE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2418, 2429; 2 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 895 (1966).
19. Nesson, Aspects of the Executive's Power over National Security Matters
Secrecy Classifications and Foreign Intelligence Wiretaps, 49 IND. L.J. 399, 406 (1974);
Rourke, Introduction to A Symposium on Administrative Secrecy: A Comparative
Perspective, 35 PuB. AD. REV. 1, 1 (1975); Comment, The First Amendment and the
Public Right to Information, 35 U. PIrr. L. REv. 93, 105 (1973); 2 WEEKLY COMP. OF
PRES. Doec. 895 (1966).
A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquir-
ing it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge
will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Gover-
nors must arm themselves with the power knowledge gives.
James Madison, Letter to W.T. Barry, quoted in EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 110-11
(1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
The assumption that the majority of the electorate is capable of intelligent issue voting
even with adequate information has, of course, been challenged. See M. ARNOLD, C.
GARVIN & G. ROSENBAUM, BEYOND POLITICS 25-28 (1974); A. CAMPBELL, P. CONVERSE,
W. MILLER & D. STOKES, THE AMERICAN VOTER (1964). The assumption is irrelevant to
the pluralist theory of modern American politics, because political parties and interest
groups channel information to and mold the voting patterns of the uninformed voter. See
M. ARNOLD, C. GARvIN & G. ROSENBAUM, supra at 45-47; B. BERELSON, P. LAZARFELD &
W. MCPHEE, VOTING (1954); V. KEY, JR., PUBLIC OPINION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
(1961). Access to accurate government information is critical to the effectiveness of
these opinion leaders. See note 31 infra.
20. G. REEDY, THE TwILIGrr OF THE PRESIDENCY 10-14, 74-81 (1970); Gravel,
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FOIA improves the ability of external critics to challenge and thus to
strengthen government policies. -1 Moreover, a policy subjected to care-
Introduction to THE PENTACON PAPERS X (M. Gravel ed. 1971); Hargrove, What Manner
of Man?, in CHOOSING THE PRESIDENT 21-28 (J. Barber ed. 1974). See generally D.
HALBERSTAM, THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST (1972).
The imperial trappings of the modern Presidency simultaneously encourage a presiden-
tial belief in his own infallibility while discouraging criticism by his close advisors. G.
REEDY, supra at 11-14, 22; Hargrove, supra at 26-27. The occasional devil's advocate is
tolerated as a necessary evil, his arguments discounted in advance. G. REEDY, supra at
II. Consequently, presidential policies often escape critical evaluation in their formative
stages; contiary data are ignored, faulty premises remain unexamined, alternative policies
remain unexplored. The unsurprising results are, all too often, egregious blunders. Some
Presidents do retain the ability to elicit honest advice from their subordinates. Experi-
ence suggests, however, that the majority of strongwilled Presidents will behave other-
wise. Hargrove, supra at 20.
David Halberstam writes of John McNaughton, an Assistant Secretary of Defense
during the Vietnam escalation, a "secret dove" who symbolized as no one else "the
incapacity to be oneself because the price of being oneself meant losing one's governmen-
tal position and respectability as a player" of the bureaucratic power game. D. HALBER-
STANI, . pra at 441. Despite the strongest personal misgivings about the escalation strat-
egy, McNaughton would not openly challenge the policies of McNamara and Johnson.
McNamara would override [his doubts], he would dampen them, it would be
business as usual, and McNaughton, the secret dove, would emerge from the
Secretary's office and hide his doubts, because he still wanted to be a player,
and he knew there was no power at the Pentagon if he differed from MoNa-
inara at all. So John McNaughton would attend meetings where some of
George Ball's people might express their doubts, the same skepticism he felt,
but he would tear them apart, into little pieces, almost rudely.
Id. at 448-49. Those who provided candid, open advice did not long retain their power.
Id. at 449-61.
Neither Congress nor the Cabinet can effectively challenge unwise presidential poli-
cies, the Cabinet lacks the political base, G. REEDY, supra at 78, and Congress lacks the
will. Congressional leaders privy to executive councils are rarely those who challenge
the assumptions of executive policy. Id. at 80. Nor can Congressmen escape the
suffocating atmosphere of the closed decisionmaking process. Senator J.W. Fulbright,
for example, was sharply critical of the abortive Bay of Pigs operation in 1961; yet
President Kennedy, musing over the disaster, thought Fulbright too would have been
swept along with the current had he been involved from the start. A. SCHLESINGFR, A
THOUSAND DAYS 259 (1965).
In short, an external critic, outside the decision process, is required.
21. F HARGROVE, THE POWER OF THE MODERN PRESIDENCY 167 (1974); G. REEDY,
supla note 20, at 11; Rourke, supra note 19, at 2. Cf. Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U.
PA L. REV. 1383, 1431 (1974). See also Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362,
1370 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975); D. EHNINGER & W. BROcKRIEDE,
DEcISION BY DEBATE (1965).
Applying this theory to previous foreign policy blunders is fraught with danger; the
advantage of hindsight obscures the uncertainties originally facing policymakers. Not-
withstanding the oft heard lament that early publication of the Pentagon Papers would
have prevented the Vietnam escalation, see, e.g., Falk, The Nuremberg Defense in the
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ful public scrutiny is likely, when implemented, to attract greater public
support.22 Finally, the FOIA might lend badly needed credibility to the
entire national security classification system. Abuses of secrecy by
recent Administrations have so eroded the sanctity of classified informa-
tion that it has become increasingly difficult to keep truly confidential
information secret.23 To the extent that the FOIA lessens abuse of the
"Top-Secret" stamp, credibility may be restored, thereby permitting vital
government secrets to remain secret.
There is little dispute that some government data is not fit for public
knowledge. Current negotiations with foreign governments, technical
details of military weapons, and covert intelligence operations illustrate
Pentagon Papers Case, 13 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 208, 213 (1974), the war continued
for four years after their appearance in 1971.
Nonetheless, respectable authority has asserted that thorough evaluation of the politi-
cal situation in Vietnam during the early 1960's with a view to alternative policies would
have permitted wiser choices. E. REiSCHAUER, BEYOND VIETNAM 32 (1967). Informed
public discussion of the merits of escalation might well have forced such an evaluation
upon the Johnson Administration, averting disaster. Gravel, supra note 20, at ix;
Hughes, The Power to Speak and the Power to Listen: Reflections on Bureaucratic
Politics and a Recommendation on Information Flows, in SECRECY AND FOREIGN POLICY
13, 37-38 (T. Franck & E. Weisband eds. 1974).
The Bay of Pigs operation was also built on faulty premises and inadequate data, G.
REEDy, supra note 20, at 12, failings that an external critic might easily have perceived.
D. WIsE, THE PoLmcs oF LYING 349 (1973). Obviously, no external critic will ever be
privy to the details, or even the existence, of covert military operations. The example
does, however, illustrate both the dangers of a closed decisionmaking process and the
strengths of open debate on foreign policy.
22. E. HARGROvE, supra note 21, at 167; Franck & Weisband, Introduction: Execu-
tive Secrecy in Three Democracies: The Parameters of Reform, in SECRECY AND
FOREIGN POLICY 1, 8 (T. Franck & E. Weisband eds. 1974).
23. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 729 (1971) (Stewart, J.,
concurring); Brief for Special Prosecutor, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974),
reprinted in L. FmEDMAN, U.S. v. NIXON 247 (1974); Dixon, Congress, Shared Adminis-
tration and Executive Privilege, in CONGREsS AGAiNST THE PRESIDENr 125, 133 (H.
Mansfield ed. 1975); Franck & Weisband, supra note 22, at 9. Professor Dixon has
stated the theory best:
The constitutional theory of plenary executive power in respect to certain kinds
of government information, whether called state-secrets doctrine or executive
privilege, palls when its political base in popular trust erodes, as the readiness
to expose the CIA has shown. Confidentiality and credibility have a symbiotic
relationship. In order to withhold, much must be disclosed.
Dixon, supra at 133. The publication of the names and addresses of CIA agents abroad,
and the release of the secret House of Representatives report on the CIA by CBS
newsman Daniel Schorr are contemporary illustrations of this phenomenon. See genera.
lly Crewdson, Leak is Studied for Illegality, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1976, § 1, at 24,
col. 1; N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1976, § 4, at 4, col. 2.
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such confidential information.2  Executive Order 1165225 requires
executive agencies to withhold material whose "unauthorized disclosure
could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national securi-
ty.' ' 2  The first exemption to the FOIA explicitly recognized these
needs; the disclosure requirements did not apply to information "specifi-
cally required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of
national defense or foreign policy. '27  The other exemptions similarly
restricted public access to information that properly should remain
confidential.28
The FOIA thus altered the balance between secrecy and openness in
government. Congress recognized that executive agencies are inevitably
biased in favor of excessive secrecy.29  Secrecy serves the parochial
interests of the bureaucracy, 30 whereas disclosure permits more effective
24. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 116-17;
Comment, supra note 17, at 416; Project, supra note 16, at 987.
25. Exec. Order No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1974), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401, at
1429 (Supp. 11 1972), quoted in note 337 infra.
26. Exec. Order No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1974), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401, at
1429 (Supp. 11 1972).
27. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1970) (amended 1974).
28. See note 14 supra.
29. Cf. Cox, supra note 21, at 1433. See also note 30 infra. The clearest proof of
this bias is the widespread abuse of the classification system. The exact figures are
unknown. Compare Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 642 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (citing testimony of retired Air Force security expert William G. Florence
that 99.5% of classified material is improperly withheld), with Comment, supra note
19, at 106 (two-thirds of secret information improperly classified). But it is beyond
cavil that classification serves no national security interest in the great majority of cases.
D. WIsE, supra note 21, at 347-48; Project, supra note 16, at 990-98; Note, supra note
9, at 420 n.98.
30. M. WEBER, 3 ECONOMY AND SocmTy 992-93 (G. Roth & C. Wittich eds. 1968);
Cox, supra note 21, at 1431-33; Nesson, supra note 19, at 406; Rourke, supra note 19, at
2. There are numerous incentives for a bureaucrat or a politician to withhold informa-
tion from the public. First, and most obvious, is simple aggrandizement of power.
Information is power. M. WEBER, supra at 992; Cox, supra note 21, at 1433; Rourke,
supra note 19, at 1. In the short run, decisions based on secret information are easier to
implement. Informed criticism is impossible; the inability to verify it makes unanswera-
ble the argument that superior information warrants the action taken.
It is one thing for a reporter or author to speculate or guess that a thing may
be so or even, quoting undisclosed sources, to say that it is so; it is quite an-
other for one in a position to know of it officially to say that it is so. The
reading public is accustomed to treating reports from uncertain sources as being
of uncertain reliability, but it would not be inclined to discredit reports of
sensitive information revealed by an official of the United States in a position
to know of what he spoke.
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby. 509 F.2d 1362, 1370 (4th Cir.), cert..denied, 421 U.S.
992 (1975). Accord, Nesson, supra note 19, at 406. Second, secrecy hides inevitable
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challenge to and public control of these institutions.3' Congress enact-
ed the FOIA in recognition of the failure of prior statutory controls82 to
offset this inevitable bias.
Before the 1974 amendments only seven decisions had even discussed
the national security exemption of the FOIA,3 two dealing with the
same documents. 34 In none of these cases did a court order in camera
inspection or seriously challenge the agency for proof beyond the fact of
classification. Only in Schaffer v. Kissinger" did the court insist on
additional proof; the agency was merely required to show that it had
properly followed its own classification procedures.
mistakes and shields the institution from criticism. Rourke, supra note 19, at 1; Vaughn,
The Freedom of Information Act and Vaughn v. Rosen: Some Personal Comments, 23
AM. U.L. REv. 865, 877 (1974); Comment, supra note 19, at 106 n.59. Finally, secrecy
hides corruption; suspicion is less likely to arise and harder to verify when information is
unavailable. Cox, supra note 21, at 1433; Miller, Secrecy in Government, CURRENT
MAGAZINE, Jan. 1974, at 13, reprinted from 37 THE PROGRESsE, Dec. 1973, at 15.
These biases inhere in the institutional structure of the executive branch. Each
derives from the natural inclination of the bureaucracy to prefer its own interests to
those of the public. Their cumulative effect is to tip the delicate balance between
secrecy and openness, see S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965), heavily in
favor of secrecy. See note 29 supra.
31. G. REEDY, supra note 20, at 11; Cox, supra note 21, at 1431. Sce note 21
supra.
32. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1964) (amended 1966).
33. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973); Schaffer v. Kissinger, 505 F.2d 389 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); Kruh v. GSA, 64 F.R.D. I (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Wolfe v. Froehlke, 358 F.
Supp. 1318 (D.D.C. 1973), affd, 510 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Aspin v. Department
of Defense, 348 F. Supp. 1081 (D.D.C. 1972), a!f'd, 491 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Moss v. Laird, Civil No. 1254 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 1971); Epstein v. Resor, 296 F. Supp. 214
(N.D. Cal. 1969), affd, 421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
34. Wolfe v. Froehlke, 358 F. Supp. 1318 (D.D.C. 1973), af 'd, 510 F.2d 654 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); Epstein v. Resor, 296 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd, 421 F.2d 930
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970). In both cases plaintiffs sought the
records of Operation Keelhaul, the forcible repatriation by the Allies of anti-Communist
Russian citizens after World War 1H. When Epstein filed suit in 1969, these documents
were classified Top Secret. Subsequently, the United States Government announced that
it had no objection to declassification, but would not release the material without British
consent, which was not forthcoming. Wolfe v. Froehlke, supra at 1320. Consequently,
the documents remained classified.
35. Schaffer v. Kissinger, 505 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Schaffer sought a copy
of Red Cross reports on the conditions in South Vietnamese prison camps. Schaffer
argued that this information had been classified after suit was filed solely to prevent
release. Nonetheless, the court held that "there may be no judicial examination
concerning the reasons and motives for an executive security classification." Id. at 391.
While the case was remanded, the only issue for the trial court to determine was whether
the _Pepartn1ept of State hd followed its owr classif cgtjon procedure§.
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A primary cause of the absence of litigation over the national security
exemption was the courts' generally restrictive interpretation of its
meaning. The first court to construe the exemption, in Epstein v.
Resor,'" adopted the view that none of the procedural provisions of the
FOIA applied when the agency claimed an exemption.17 Consequently,
the court conducted no hearing and required the agency to submit no
proof justifying the claim of exemption.38 Although disapproving this
broad construction, the Ninth Circuit on appeal upheld the ruling as
applied to the national security exemption. 9 The court held that
Congress had explicitly assigned the underlying factual issue, the propri-
ety of classification, to the executive, so that judicial review of that issue
was unauthorized.40  The Supreme Court accepted and broadened this
interpretation in EPA v. Mink,4 in which Representative Patsy Mink
sued the EPA to acquire classified information about an underground
nuclear test. The Court agreed that the agency had fulfilled its burden
under the national security exemption by proving that the material had
been classified according to executive order.4" Moreover, the Court
refused to permit in camera judicial inspection to segregate for public
release those portions of the documents that did not meet the standards
of Executive Order 11,652.43
The Court in Mink probably realized that it was making a "sham-
bles" of the FOIA, at least for classified information,44 but assigned the
responsibility to Congress: "Obviously, this test was not the only
alternative available. But Congress chose to follow the Executive's
determination in these matters and that choice must be honored. ' 43
36. Epstein v. Resor, 296 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Cal. 1969), af 'd, 421 F.2d 930 (9th
Cir.J, cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
37, 1& at 216-17.
38. Id.
39. 421 F.2d at 932-33.
40. Id. at 933.
41. 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
42. Id. at 81-83; id. at 94 (Stewart, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 84. This ruling was especially unfortunate in view of the practice of
"derivative classification," in which a document acquires a security classification equal to
that of the most secret item used in its preparation or mentioned within. Nesson, supra
note 19, at 402-03. Thus, had Blackstone's Commentaries been classified Top Secret,
the entire West system would be derivatively classified as Top Secret. Id. The
opportunity for abuse is as clear as the value of the FOIA which segregates nonclassified
material for release.
44. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 94-95 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 81. It is probable that Mink misinterpreted congressional intent. See
Vol. 1976:609] 617
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Honoring that choice meant that henceforth the only issue for a court to
determine was whether the requested information had been classified
under executive procedures, although dicta in two lower court opinions
suggested a possible exception when the classification was wholly arbi-
trary or capricious, 46 or motivated by fraud or subterfuge.47
The 1974 amendments to the FOIA were an outgrowth of congres-
sional dissatisfaction with Mink, fueled by a Watergate-induced skepti-
cism of executive secrecy. Four of the revisions dealt with the national
security exemption. 48  First, Congress authorized but did not mandate
in camera inspection as a part of the de novo hearing. 49  Second, the
exemption was rewritten to exempt from disclosure matters that are
"specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive
order to be kept in the interest of national defense or foreign policy
and . . . , are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive
order."50 Third, Congress required the release of any reasonably seg-
regable nonsecret portion of any record after deleting the exempt por-
tions.r1 Finally, the amendments clarified the executive's burden of
proof in national security cases; unless classification is more reasonable
than release, the exemption does not apply.5 2
These amendments, although specifically intended to overrule
Note, supra note 16, at 932. The case illustrates judicial reluctance to challenge
presidential decisions in foreign policy and related matters. See note 281 infra.
46. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 47, 51 (4th Cir. 1973). See also Epstein v.
Resor, 421 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970) (Pre-Mink case
allowing same exception).
47. Wolfe v. Froehlke, 358 F. Supp. 1318, 1320 (D.D.C. 1973), afrd, 510 F.2d 654
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
48. The 1974 amendments also revised portions of the FOIA unrelated to national
security. The amendments replaced the "identifiable record" test, see note 11 supra,
with a "reasonable description" requirement, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3) (A) (Supp. IV 1974),
and permitted the court to award attorneys' fees against the Government when the
complainant substantially prevailed, id. § 552(a)(4), and to trigger disciplinary action
against civil servants who arbitrarily or capriciously denied information to the public. Id.
§ 552(a)(4)(F). Agencies must respond to a request within ten working days. Id. §
552(a) (6). Congress also rewrote the seventh exemption, which dealt with investigato-
ry files of law enforcement agencies, id. § 552(b) (7), and required each agency to report
to Congress on its efforts to comply with the purposes of the Act. Id. § 552(d).
49. Id. § 552(a)(4)(B). See H.R. REP. No. 93-876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8,
reprinted in [1974] U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws 6267, 6272.
50. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1) (Supp. IV 1974).
51. Id. § 552(b).
52. Id. § 552(b) (1). See H.R. RP. No. 93-876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted





Mink,5" in fact impose much heavier constraints on executive secrecy
than even the Mink dissent had contemplated.54 Congresswoman Mink
had requested in camera review to segregate nonsecret portions from the
classified materials.5 5 While the 1974 amendments authorize this pro-
cedure, they also grant final authority to the district judge to release
improperly classified material.5" Although the court must give "sub-
stantial weight" to an agency's affidavit on the merits of classification,"
it is clear that the final determination of the propriety of the classifi-
cation rests with the court.58 Moreover, the agency must assume the
burden of proof to justify the classification.59 The 1974 amendments
are thus a plain expression of congressional desire that the courts, not
the executive, decide what information would, if released, injure the
national security.60 Consequently, the 1974 amendments raise unique
constitutional questions of the power of Congress to assign and the
judiciary to accept final responsibility for classification of documents
related to foreign policy and national defense. The remainder of this
Note will examine those questions.
II. THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE IN THE
COMMON LAW OF EVIDENCE
The most extensive case law involving classified information has
53. See H.R. REP. No. 93-876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CoDE
CONG. & An. NEWS 6267, 6272.
54. See note 56 infra.
55. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 78 (1973).
56. H.R. REP. No. 93-876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD, NEWS 6267, 6272. This was significantly more than the Mink dissent
envisioned. "The Court of Appeals never dreamed that the trial judge would declassify
documents." EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 109 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Yet that
was precisely what the 1974 amendments allowed.
57. CONF. REP. No. 93-1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
58. The Department of Defense viewed this as permitting the courts to "second
guess" security classifications, of which it took a predictably dim view. H.R. REP. No.
93-876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (Appendix containing remarks of L. Niederlehner).
See also Project, supra note 16, at 1049; Comment, National Security and the Public's
Right to Know: A New Role for the Courts Under the Freedom of Information Act,
123 U. PA. L. REv. 1438, 1450 (1975).
59. A preliminary version of the amendments would have permitted a "reasonable
basis" for the classification to sustain the agency's position. Comment, supra note 58, at
1449. The Senate deleted this provision at the urging of Senator Muskie, who properly
believed it would raise an insurmountable barrier to challenges to agency action. Id. See
also Clark, Holding Government Accountable: The Amended Freedom of Information
Act, 84 YALE L.J. 741, 757 (1975).
60. Comment, supra note 58, at 1450.
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arisen when the Government claimed an evidentiary privilege in litiga-
tion-the state secrets privilege."' The state secrets privilege protects
military and diplomatic secrets from compulsory disclosure. Unlike
executive privilege this privilege is grounded, not in the constitutional
separation of powers, but in "the principles of the common law...
interpreted ...in the light of reason and experience. 0 2 Therefore,
the evidentiary rules of the state secrets privilege are not dispositive
of the constitutional issues raised by the 1974 FOIA amendments.0 3
Nonetheless, the principles derived from the evidentiary privilege are
important in resolving the constitutional issues. First, the issues of
judicial competence and executive bias are similar.Y4 Second, the cus-
tom and usage developed in litigation, reinforced by congressional ac-
tion, guide the constitutional interpretation."8 Finally, courts will nat-
urally analogize to the common law privilege since it is the only
significant body of apposite case law, a conclusion strongly supported by
the recent litigation involving the Nixon tapes.60
The leading American case is United States v. Reynolds, 7 a suit
against the Air Force under the Federal Tort Claims Act.08 Plaintiff's
husband was killed when an Air Force bomber crashed during a test of
secret electronic equipment. Plaintiff subpoenaed the official accident
investigation report, which the Government, under formal claim of
privilege by the Secretary of the Air Force, declined to produce, assert-
ing that it contained national security data about the aircraft's mission.
Instead, the Government offered to provide the three survivors of the
crash, without cost to the plaintiff, and to refresh their memories with all
statements made during the investigation. 0 The district court ordered
in camera inspection of the report to verify its privileged status,70 and
61. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); PROP. FED. R. EVID. 509, 56
F.R.D. 183, 251 (1973).
62. FED. R. Evw. 501.
63. Cox, supra note 21, at 1416. See notes 117-22 infra and accompanying text.
64. See notes 85-88, 344 infra and accompanying text.
65. Cf. Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. Cm. L. Rnv.
761,793 (1967).
66. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700
(D.C. Cir. 1973). See notes 131-59 infra and accompanying text.
67. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1970).
69. 345 U.S. at 5.
70. Brauner v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 469 (E.D. Pa. 1950), aff'd sub nom.




entered judgment for plaintiff when the Air Force refused to comply.71
On appeal the Supreme Court reversed and held that when alternative
sources of evidence minimized the need for material under a formal
claim of privilege, a court should not jeopardize state secrets even by in
camera judicial inspection."
Commentators have accurately characterized the opinion in Reynolds
as "Janus-faced, ' '73 almost deliberately vague on the critical issues.74
The spirit of compromise which permeated the Court's opinion caused
serious ambiguities:
The court itself must determine whether the circumstances are appro-
priate for the claim of privilege, and yet do so without forcing a dis-
closure of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.. . . Ju-
dicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the
caprice of executive officers. Yet we will not go so far as to say that
the court may automatically require a complete disclosure to the judge
before the claim of privilege will be accepted in any case. It may be
possible to satisfy the court, from all the circumstances of the case, that
there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose
military matters which, in the interest of national security, should not
be divulged. When this is the case, the occasion for the privilege is ap-
propriate, and the court should not jeopardize the security which the
privilege is meant to protect by insisting upon an examination of the evi-
dence, even by the judge alone, in chambers.. . . Where there is a
strong showing of necessity, the claim of privilege should not be lightly
accepted, but even the most compelling necessity cannot overcome the
claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that military secrets
are at stake. 715
71. See Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 991 (3d Cir. 1951), rev'd, 345 U.S.
1 (1953). The district court's order entering judgment for plaintiff was unreported.
72. 345 U.S. at 10.
73. Karst & Horowitz, Presidential Prerogative and Judicial Review, 22 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 47, 64 n.94 (1974).
74. Berger, How the Privilege for Government Information Met Its Watergate, 25
CASE W, RES. L. REv. 747, 751-53 (1975).
75. 345 U.S. at 8-11. Compare the statement of the Reynolds holding in Machin v.
Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336, 341 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 896 (1963) ("the
Supreme Court did not require submission of the report there involved to a court for a
judicial determination of the applicability of the privilege invoked to the contents of the
report in question"), with the view taken in Nader v. Butz, 60 F.R.D. 381, 384-85
(D DC. 1973):
The Court held that if the trial court were satisfied from all the circumstances
of the case that disclosure of the evidence would expose military secrets which
should not be disclosed for national security reasons, even in camera inspection
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Although addressing a common law evidentiary issue, the opinion also
contained constitutional overtones. The Court's failure in Reynolds to
distinguish the responsibility for determining when the privilege applies
from its scope when applicable has thus created confusion in both
constitutional and common law.76 Nonetheless, some common themes
have emerged.
First, who may claim the common law privilege? Reynolds consid-
ered this issue specifically, and concluded that the head of the department
controlling the information must lodge a formal claim of privilege 7
after personal examination. 78  A private party, even a former official,
cannot invoke the privilege. 7  This is not a purely technical require-
ment, because the courts must rely heavily on executive judgment when
state secrets are implicated.80 Only personal consideration by the incum-
bent department chief guarantees adequate evaluation of the public
interests involved. The initial responsibility for claiming the state se-
crets privilege is thus exclusively an executive function.
Second, who finally determines if the common law privilege applies?
Although claims of the state secrets privilege are comparatively rare, the
general principle that the judiciary, not the executive, makes the final
decision whether the privilege applies has been uniformly upheld.8,
would not be required. Implicit in this statement is a requirement that the trial
court must be satisfied without in camera inspection that the claim of privilege
is a proper one.
76. The state secrets privilege, if applicable, is absolute. If military or diplomatic
secrets are involved, the court may not compel their production in open court or their use
in evidence. See notes 101-02 infra. The scope of the privilege, however, is analytically
distinct from the threshold issue of who finally decides if the subpoenaed evidence does
contain such secrets. The litigation over the Nixon tapes is the most recent illustration
of the confusion of these separate issues; only Judge Wilkey's dissent in Nixon v. Sirica
correctly identified as critical the threshold issue of who decides. Nixon v. Sirica, 487
F.2d 700, 763 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
77. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8 (1953).
78. Kinoy v. Mitchell, 67 F.R.D. 1, 8 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
79. Id. Cf. Halperin v. Kissinger, 401 F. Supp. 272 (D.D.C. 1975); Nixon v.
Sampson, 389 F. Supp. 107 (D.D.C.), stayed sub nom. Nixon v. Richey, 513 F.2d 430
(D.C. Cir. 1975); Sun Oil Co. v. United States, 514 F.2d 1020 (Ct. Cl. 1975). Each of
these cases rejected former President Nixon's claim of a constitutional privilege for
internal discussions before he left office. In none of these cases did President Ford
invoke the privilege.
80. Kinoy v. Mitchell, 67 F.R.D. I (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
81. Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1958); Kinoy v. Mitchell, 67
F.R.D. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Snyder v. United States, 20 F.R.D. 7 (E.D.N.Y. 1956);
Cresmer v. United States, 9 F.R.D. 203 (E.D.N.Y. 1949).
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Dicta in cases considering other claims of privilege confirm this rule.8 2
The court's reasoning in Snyder v. United States 3 is representative of
the legal analysis:
[Tihe Government should realize that at such time as it comes before
a court of law, it is subjected to and bound by the rules of law and may
not, without regard to the law, arbitrarily decline to produce informa-
tion upon the claim of a self-imposed restriction that it is classified infor-
mation or that its disclosure would injure national security. . . . [IIf
an adversary party in a pending action properly requests the information
and the Government declines to respond because of alleged military
secrecy, then it is obliged to submit the information or records to the
Court for its determination as to whether the claim of privilege is well
founded. The point is that when the matter is in litigation the Court
and not a Government agency must ultimately adjudicate the question
of privilege.8 4
The policy argument for a court as the final arbiter is compelling.
When the Government is a litigant, executive determination of the
propriety of the privilege creates a clear conflict of interest.85  As the
court ruled in Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg:86
[N]o executive official or agency can be given absolute authority to
determine what documents in his possession may be considered by the
court in its task. Otherwise the head of an executive department would
have the power on his own say so to cover up all evidence of fraud and
82. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Committee for Nuclear
Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788, 793-94 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Carr v. Monroe Mfg.
Co., 431 F.2d 384, 388 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1000 (1971); Sperandeo
v. Milk Drixers and Dairy Employees Local 527, 334 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1964);
Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336, 341 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 896 (1963);
NLRB v. Capitol Fish Co., 294 F.2d 868, 875 (5th Cir. 1961); In re Midwest Milk
Monopolization Litigation, 60 F.R.D. 12, 17 (W.D. Mo. 1973); Philadelphia News-
papers, Inc. v. HUD, 343 F. Supp. 1176, 1178 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1972); FDIC v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 53 F.R.D. 260, 262 n.2 (W.D. Okla. 1971); O'Keefe v. Boeing
Co., 38 F.R.D. 329, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,
38 F.R.D. 57, 63 (N.D. Ohio 1964); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States,
157 F. Supp. 939, 947 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
83. 20 F.R.D. 7 (E.D.N.Y. 1956).
84. Id. at 9.
85. Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788, 793-94 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); Carr v. Monroe Mfg. Co., 431 F.2d 384, 389 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 1000 (1971); NLRB v. Capitol Fish Co., 294 F.2d 868, 876 (5th Cir. 1961);
Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36, 43 (2d Cir. 1958); Brief for Special Prosecutor,
supra note 23, at 221.
86. 463 F.2d 788 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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corruption when a federal court or grand jury was investigating mal-
feasance in office, and this is not the law.87
In contrast to the bias inherent in a litigant judging the validity of his
own privilege, the courts are well-suited to a principled, impartial reso-
lution of the applicability of the state secrets privilege s8  Consequently,
the courts, not the executive, determine when the privilege applies.
Third, may the courts use in camera review to determine the applica-
bility of the common law privilege? Although Reynolds is most ambig-
uous on this question, 9 a fair reading of the case law supports an
affirmative answer, at least when inspection is necessary to an informed
judicial decision. 0° Reynolds strongly implied that the court could
order in camera review if appropriate, noting that "It may be possible to
satisfy the court, from all the circumstances of the case, that there is a
reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military
matters. . . ."91 and that "In each case, the showing of necessity which
is made will determine how far the court should probe in satisfying itself
that the occasion for invoking the privilege is appropriate." 2 Reynolds
was an easy decision; the alternative witnesses minimized the need for
the accident report, which was almost certain to include information
about the secret electronic devices that prompted the mission. The ad
hoc approach of Reynolds should, however, allow in camera inspection
if the decision is more difficult. Indeed, in Halpern v. United States,9 3
the Second Circuit explicitly authorized an entire trial in camera. Plain-
tiff brought suit under the Invention Secrecy Act of 1951,04 which
authorizes compensation to inventors unable to patent devices because
87. Id. at 794. See also notes 291-99 infra and accompanying text.
88. Karst & Horowitz, supra note 73, at 56-57. This statement assumes judicially
manageable standards, see notes 332-44 infra and accompanying text, by which the
courts can assess the merits of the executive's claim of privilege.
89. 345 U.S. at 8-11.
90. Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1958); Kinoy v. Mitchell, 67
F.R.D. 1, 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 368 F. Supp. 1098, 1139-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd, 505 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974);
Nader v. Butz, 60 F.R.D. 381, 384-85 (D.D.C. 1973); In re Midwest Milk Monopoliza-
tion Litigation, 60 F.R.D. 12, 17 (W.D. Mo. 1973); Cresmer v. United States, 9 F.R.D.
203 (E.D.N.Y. 1949). But see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710-11 (1974);
Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336, 341 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 896 (1963);
Berger, supra note 74, at 785-86.
91. 345 U.S. at 10 (emphasis added). See also Clark, supra note 59, at 754.
92. 345 U.S. at 11 (emphasis added).
93. 258 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1958).
94. 35 U.SC. §§ 181-88 (1970).
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of a national security interest in their secrecy. The Government formal-
ly invoked the state secrets privilege. The court held, however, that
Congress had implicitly authorized an in camera trial to protect plain-
tiff's right to compensation.9" The court in Pan American World
Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,96 though declining to
order in camera review of documents under a formal claim of privilege,
strongly implied that such review would have been proper had plain-
tiff's need been greater or the case for secrecy less clear.97
In camera review is routine if the executive claims other privileges. 98
In national security matters the movant must show significantly greater
need for the subpoenaed document,99 because in camera inspection
exposes the information to marginally greater risk of disclosure. The
law is clear, however, that in camera review is permissible in appropriate
circumstances. The policy considerations underlying final judicial reso-
lution of the propriety of the privilege apply equally to in camera
inspection. Informed judicial decisionmaking is the ultimate goal; ac-
95. Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36, 43 (2d Cir. 1958). The court authorized
but did not require the in camera proceeding, on condition that the trial court found no
serious risk of divulging military secrets in conducting it. There was clearly no danger
of plaintiff acquiring such secrets since he was well acquainted with the details of his
own invention. Id. at 44. Thus the court refused to apply the state secrets privilege
when "disclosure to court personnel in an in camera proceeding will not make the
information public or endanger national security." Id. The basis for the holding,
however, was not the common law of evidence, but the court's reading of congressional
intent to authorize such a proceeding. Id. at 43.
96. 368 F. Supp. 1098 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), a! 'd, 505 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974).
97. Id. at 1139.
98. E.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d
700 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Sperandeo v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Local 527,
334 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1964); Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 896 (1963); Theriault v. United States, 395 F. Supp. 637 (C.D. Cal.
1975); Rabbitt v. Department of Air Force, 401 F. Supp. 1206 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Carl
Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C. 1966), aff'd sub nom.
V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952
(1967); United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 15 F.R.D. 224 (S.D. Cal. 1953);
United States v. Cotton Valley Operators Comm., 9 F.R.D. 719 (W.D. La. 1949), aft'd
by an equally divided court, 339 U.S. 940 (1950). See generally Note, supra note 17.
99. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1953); Kinoy v. Mitchell, 67
F.R.D. 1, 9 tS.D.N.Y. 1975); Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 368 F. Supp. 1098, 1139 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd, 505 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974); Carl
Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C. 1966), aff'd sub nom.
V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952
(1967); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl.
1958).
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tual inspection of the documents may constitute the only means by
which the judiciary can properly evaluate executive assertions.100
Fourth, what is the proper scope of the common law privilege when it
does apply? The rule is clear; if military or diplomatic secrets are at
stake, the privilege is absolute and cannot be overcome by "even the
most compelling necessity."' 01 This rule is grounded in a sober judicial
recognition that only the executive branch can assess the consequences
of public release of such data.'02 Other common law privileges tradi-
tionally claimed by the executive, however, are more limited. The
internal discussions privilege, for example, codified in the fifth exemp-
tion to the FOIA,103 has two qualifications. First, it cannot be used to
shield ongoing criminal activity; the privilege takes flight when
abused.' 0 4 Second, the privilege might not withstand a compelling need
for production. 05
The development of the common law state secrets privilege therefore
supports the conflict of interest thesis initially outlined. 00 Although
the executive retains the initial authority, and despite the grave public
consequences of erroneous release, the courts ultimately determine if the
100. See generally Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318
(D.D.C. 1966), affd sub nom. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967).
101. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953); Totten v. United States, 92
U.S. (2 Otto) 105 (1875); Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Heine v.
Raus, 399 F.2d 785 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 914 (1971); Timken Roller
Bearing Co. v. United States, 38 F.R.D. 57 (N.D. Ohio 1964) (dictum).
102. See notes 332-44 infra and accompanying text.
103. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1970) (amended 1974).
104. Black v. Sheraton Corp., 371 F. Supp. 97, 102 (D.D.C. 1974); Rosee v. Board of
Trade, 36 F.R.D. 684, 690 (N.D. Ill. 1965); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 25
F.R.D. 485 (D.NJ. 1960). Cf. In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1,
12-13 (D.D.C.), affd sub nom. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(constitutionally-based executive privilege for confidential communications). See gener-
ally Cox, supra note 21, at 1413. Most evidentiary privileges are waived when used to
shield current or contemplated criminal activity. See, e.g., Gravel v. United States, 408
U.S. 606, 627 (1972) (Senator's speech and debate clause privilege); Clark v. United
States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933) (jury deliberations); United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1971) (attorney-client privilege). See notes 156-
58 infra and accompanying text.
105. Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788, 791 (D.C. Cir.
1971); Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336, 340 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 896
(1963); Halperin v. Kissinger, 401 F. Supp. 272 (D.D.C. 1975); Rabbitt v. Department
of Air Force, 401 F. Supp. 1206, 1208 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See generally Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
106. See text accompanying notes 10-11 supra.
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privilege applies. "[R]eason and experience '10 7 dictate that the con-
flict of interest debars the executive from serving as both litigant and
judge. In camera inspection, if necessary to an informed decision, is a
logical corollary to final judicial authority.
In construing the original FOIA, the courts naturally sought guidance
in the common law of evidentiary privilege. The Act explicitly author-
ized final judicial decision when agencies sought to conceal informa-
tion.1"8 Except for cases involving the national security exemption,
Mink permitted in camera review,10 9 and the courts readily accepted the
invitation."0 Courts and commentators generally regarded the exemp-
tions as codifying the common law,"' with the possible exception of the
national security exemption."12 The policy reasons for ultimate court
determination were identical to those in the common law; were an
agency's claim to absolute privilege accepted on its face, then "[tihe
Freedom of Information Act could become nothing more than a legisla-
tive statement of unenforceable rights.""'  The major change from the
common law was that the agency, rather than the movant, bore the
107. FED. R. Evm. 501.
108. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970) (amended 1974).
109. 410 U.S. at 93. The Court assumed that "Congress legislated against the
backdrop" of the case law concerning the evidentiary privilege. Id. at 89. While in
camera inspection should not be automatic or inevitable, the Court did not question its
propriety when necessary for the agency to sustain its burden of proof. Id. at 93.
110. Rose v. Department of Air Force, 495 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1974), aff'd, 96 S. Ct.
1592 (1976); Cuneo v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 977 (1974); Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 977 (1974); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1973); Soucie v. David,
448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied. 400 U.S. 824 (1970); Ackerley v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
Kreindler v. Department of Navy, 363 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Williams v. IRS,
345 F. Supp. 591, 594 (D. Del. 1972), aff'd per curtam, 479 F.2d 317 (3d Cir. 1973);
Cowles Communications, Inc. v. Department of Justice, 325 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Cal.
1971 ). See generally Note, supra note 17.
111. Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Nixon v. Sirica, 487
F.2d 700, 768-69 (Wilkey, J., dissenting); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 47, 52 (4th Cir.
1973); Wu v. National Endowment for the Humanities, 460 F.2d 1030, 1034 (5th Cir.
1972), cept. denied, 410 U.S. 926 (1973); Rabbitt v. Department of Air Force, 401 F.
Supp. 1206, 1208 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); EEOC v. Los Alamos Contractors, Inc., 382 F.
Supp. 1373, 1379 (D.N.M. 1974); Stokes v. Hodgson, 347 F. Supp. 1371, 1376 (N.D.
Ga. 1972), afj'd, 476 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1973); Note, supra note 16, at 930; Project,
supra note 16, at 1020; Comment, The Doctrine of Executive Privilege Limits Statutory
Access to Infonnation Held within the Executive Office of the President, 49 TEx. L.
REv. 780, 786 (1971).
112. See notes 115-16 infra and accompanying text.
113. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 715 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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burden of proof.11 Thus the common law of evidentiary privilege
guided and shaped the courts' treatment of the original FOTA.
For national security information, however, courts took a more re-
strictive view of their powers than required by the common law privi-
lege." 5 The basis was the Supreme Court's reading of congressional
intent in Mink, rather than a further limitation on the common law
privilege. Indeed, Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Mink strong-
ly suggested legislative revision of the exemption to approach more
closely the boundaries of the evidentiary privilege.110
Although the development of the state secrets privilege is consistent
with the constitutional validity of the amended FOIA, the common law
is not dispositive of a constitutional allocation of power. There are
substantive differences between the executive's position as a litigant and
as a respondent under the FOIA. First, the executive is not obliged
ultimately to disclose anything when it appears as a private litigant or a
prosecutor. In both civil and criminal cases, the executive has the
option of forfeiting the case in order to preserve the secrecy of the
subpoenaed information." 7  The inference is that the executive must
comply with judicial orders when it seeks judicial assistance, whether to
incarcerate criminals, escape a judgment for damages, or enforce execu-
tive policy on the community;" 8 but these orders do not bind the
114. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3) (1970 )(amended 1974).
115. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973); Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
116. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 94-95 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).
117. Comment, The President Does not Have an Absolute Privilege to Withhold
Evidence from a Grand Jury, 87 HARv. L. Rav. 1557, 1565 (1974). The leading case in
criminal procedure is Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), which held that govern-
ment suppression of evidence favorable to the accused violates due process, regardless of
the good faith of the prosecutor. In civil cases, the trial judge has wide latitude to grant
relief to the opposing party, including a directed verdict. FEn. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2). See,
e.g., Sperandeo v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Local 537, 334 F.2d 381 (10th
Cir. 1964); United States v. Cotton Valley Operators Comm., 9 F.R.D. 719 (W.D.
La. 1949), afO d by an equally divided Court, 339 U.S. 940 (1950).
118. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728-30 (1971)
(Stewart, J., concurring); Snyder v. United States, 20 F.R.D. 7, 9 (E.D.N.Y. 1956),
quoted in text accompanying note 84 supra. Cf. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414,
468 (1944) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ("whenever the judicial power is called into play, it
is responsible directly to the fundamental law and no other authority can intervene to
force or authorize the judicial body to disregard it"). Under civil rules no adverse
inference may be drawn from a proper claim of privilege, diluting somewhat the force of
this argument. See Bishop, The Executive's Right of Privacy: An Unresolved Constitu-




executive when it acts alone pursuant to a constitutional grant of exclu-
sive power. Lawsuits under the FOIA arguably intrude on the purely
executive function of classifying national security information." 9 Sec-
ond, neither in FOIA cases nor in other litigation has the President
personally claimed a constitutionally-based executive privilege for mili-
tary or diplomatic secrets.120 The President, as commander in chief of
the armed forces and sole representative of the nation abroad, may, in
consequence of the separation of powers, retain authority to deny infor-
mation that the FOIA directs to be released, even if his subordinates
must comply.12' 1 Recognizing the "serious constitutional questions"
such a claim would pose, courts have avoided discussion of its merits. 2 -
Nonetheless, judicial familiarity with the common law privilege and
the experience of working with the executive branch in that context
suggest that the courts will rely on the state secrets privilege as a
persuasive analogy should the President formally invoke executive privi-
lege in response to an FOIA suit for classified material.' 23 The recent
decisions in the Watergate tapes litigation' 24 support this conclusion in
holding that the constitutionally-based internal discussions privilege par-
alleled almost exactly the common law evidentiary privilege.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE FOR
INTERNAL DISCUSSIONS
The litigation over the Watergate tapes raised several constitutional
issues. Relevant to this Note was former President Nixon's claim to a
constitutional privilege shielding confidential communications with his
advisors from compulsory disclosure. Both the common law 25 and the
FOIA"'- recognize a qualified internal discussions privilege. The
Nixon claim, however, arose from the concept of separation of powers;
it postulated a privilege unknown to statutory or common law-absolute
119. See Project, supra note 16, at 1000-01; notes 179-89, 239-45 infra and accompa-
nying text.
120. Comment, supra note 117, at 1565.
121. Project, supra note 16, at 1016.
122. E.g., Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1071-72 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
123. See notes 64-66 supra and accompanying text.
124. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
125. See notes 103-05 supra and accompanying text.
126. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (5) (Supp. IV 1974).
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in scope, applicable in the sole discretion of the President, over which
courts and Congress held no power.
The explicit rejection of this claim to absolute, unreviewable executive
privilege in the tapes litigation 127 provides significant insights into the
constitutional merits of the amended FOIA. First, United States v.
Nixon is the only Supreme Court opinion that directly addresses the
issue of executive privilege in a constitutional sense. Second, the rule
emerging from the Watergate decisions, properly interpreted, establishes
a constitutional privilege for internal discussions closely resembling the
common law privilege. The inference is that the common law would
also guide the judicial development of a constitutional privilege for
national security information. 2 " Finally, the constitutional basis of an
absolute, unreviewable executive privilege for confidential communica-
tions is much stronger than the case for a similar presidential privilege for
national security data.' 29 Despite contrary dicta, 130 United States v.
Nixon thus supports the constitutionality of the amended FOIA.
In the first principal tapes decision, Nixon v. Sirica,131 the Watergate
grand jury suboenaed nine presidential tapes. Claiming a constitutional
privilege for confidential communications with his advisors, President
Nixon sought a writ of mandamus to quash Judge Sirica's order uphold-
ing the subpoena.132 Although granting the "greatest weight and defer-
ence" to executive views, 3' the District of Columbia Circuit held that
"the applicability of the privilege is in the end for the [courts] and not
the executive to decide."' 4  The presumptive privilege for internal
discussions was overcome by the "uniquely powerful showing" by the
Special Prosecutor,3 5 requiring in camera judicial inspection to deter-
mine if the privilege applied'8" and to segregate irrelevant or privileged
material.137  Material relating to "Watergate and the alleged coverup"
127. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
128. Cox, supra note 21, at 1384. See also note 140 infra.
129. See notes 174-75, 309-10 infra and accompanying text.
130. 418 U.S. at 710-11. See notes 244-45 infra and accompanying text.
131. 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
132. In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C.), afj'd sub nom,
Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
133. 487 F.2d at 713.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 717.
136. Id. at 718-20.
137. Id. at 720-21.
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would, of course, be disclosed.138  The court thus produced a constitu-
tional rule similar to the common law privilege: the President alone
asserts the privilege, but the courts alone finally determine its applicabil-
ity in a specific instance. If plaintiff demonstrates a sufficiently com-
pelling need, the court may review the material in camera to reach an
informed decision.139
Judge Wilkey's dissent properly criticized both the logic of the majori-
ty opinion"' and the cases on which it relied. With one exception, 41
these cases discussed the common law privilege and ignored the separa-
tion of powers argument on which the President's claim to absolute
privilege rested. 1 2  The majority result is nonetheless defensible. De-
spite an explicit disclaimer," 3 the factor which ultimately persuaded the
majority was almost surely the clear showing of personal involvement by
President Nixon in the very illegal actions which the grand jury sought
to investigate.144  "[A] sound Hamiltonian sense of 'structure and
relationship' "", would dictate judicial resolution of the merits of a
claim of privilege when the President suffers so clear a conflict of
interest.1 46  While the court was understandably reluctant to articulate
138. Id. at 720.
139. Compare this rule with the common law privilege discussed in text accompany-
ing notes 106-07 supra. The similarity between the constitutional privilege and the evi-
dentiary privilege, however, was the basis of Judge Wilkey's dissent. 487 F.2d at 763-64
(Wilkey, J., dissenting). See note 140 infra.
140. The Per Curiam here never confronts the fundamental Constitutional ques-
tion of separation of powers, but instead prefers to treat the case as if all were
involved was a weighing and balancing of conflicting public interests ...
[T]he most fundamental, necessarily decisive issue is, Who Does the weighing
and balancing of conflicting public interests? The District Judge or the Presi-
dent? The answer to this question necessarily involves the Constitutional
question of separation of powers. But the whole line of reasoning, the whole
line of authorities, relied on by the Per Curiam does not deal with the separa-
tion of powers issue at all.
487 F.2d at 763 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
141. Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
142. In addition to Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, the court relied on United
States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); Olson Rug Co. v. NLRB, 291 F.2d 655 (7th Cir.
1961); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 38 F.R.D. 57 (N.D. Ohio 1964);
United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 25 F.R.D. 485 (D.N.J. 1960); and, Kaiser
Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl. 1958). 487
F.2d at 713 n.60. None of these cases considered a claim of executive privilege based
on separation of powers.
143. 487 F.2d at 718.
144. Id. at 717.
145. Karst & Horowitz, supra note 73, at 58.
146. Judge MacKinnon attempted to refute the majority's concern with presidential
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it, the rule in Nixon v. Sirica is probably that the President is the
ultimate arbiter of the applicability of the constitutional privilege for
internal discussions, absent proof of a disabling conflict of interest, such
as personal involvement in criminal activity under investigation. 14 7  Be-
cause evidence supporting such a conflict of interest will also tend to
prove great public need for presidential information, the latter standard
could serve as a surrogate for a rule 148 the court preferred not to state
publicly. 149
In the second principal tapes decision, United States v. Nixon,1 0 the
Supreme Court adopted a similar rule in holding that the President's
general interest in confidentiality, though constitutionally based, must
yield to the "demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending
criminal trial."'' The Court agreed that the internal discussions privi-
lege was constitutionally grounded in the separation of powers," 2 but
the common law qualifications still attached. The Court reasoned that
it is "emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
abuse of an unlimited privilege by noting that power may be abused wherever it
ultimately rests. 487 F.2d at 743 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). This truism is unrespon-
sive to the conflict of interest. Even honest men cannot fairly judge their own cause; the
mere existence of a conflict of interest increases the likelihood of abuse of power. That
chance is reduced by assigning decisionmaking authority elsewhere in such instances. See
Brief for Special Prosecutor, supra note 23, at 221, 245-47; Cox, supra note 21, at 1409-
10.
147. Although Judge Wilkey's dissent correctly identified the crucial issue, his resolu-
tion of that issue and his perception of the underlying basis for the majority result were
less accurate. If this situation has no precedent "in any case for 184 years," 487 F.2d at
772 (Wilkey, J., dissenting), it is because our public officials have been generally honest
men. Thus the interbranch disputes on which Wilkey relies, id. at 768-73, are inapplica-
ble; the Senate per se, for example, suffered no conflict of interest in United States v,
Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972), a case illustrative of those relied on by Wilkey, 487 F.2d
at 772. It is significant that the most nearly analogous cases, United States v. Burr, 25
F. Cas. 30 (C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14692d), and United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187
(C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14694), concerned the prosecution of the former Vice-President, a
bitter political enemy of President Jefferson. The possibility of a presidential conflict of
interest was obvious.
The Wilkey dissent has also attracted criticism of the historical data on which it relies,
R. BaGER, ExECUTIVE PmIVIEGE: A CoNsTTUnoNAL MYrI 348-72 (1974); Cox, supra
note 21, at 1394-95.
148. See text accompanying notes 159-61 infra.
149. But see Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon,
498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
150. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
151. Id. at 713.
152. Id. at 708.
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say what the law is."' Consequently, the courts, not the President,
ultimately determine if the privilege applies. 4  An appropriate show-
ing of need will subject even the most intimate presidential conversations
to in camera review, and possible use in court. In this case the
presidential interest in confidential discussions was subordinate to the
demands of the criminal justice system.1'5
United States v. Nixon adopted a constitutional privilege parallel to
the common law privilege, but less protective of presidential conversa-
tions. 1 '  It is not clear that the common law would permit a "demon-
strated, specific need for evidence" to override the presidential interest
in confidentialty."7 It is improbable, however, that the Court intended
to allow every criminal prosecution to override a formal claim of consti-
tutional privilege, even if the defendant could prove a specific need. The
precedential value of the case is probably limited to the narrow rule that
the privilege takes flight when abused. Such a holding, however, would
have required a detailed recitation of the evidence implicating the
President and a finding of probable cause of criminal complicity. This
would have detracted from the Court's effort to appear neutral in the
political storms that swirled around the impeachment controversy. Fac-
153. Id. at 703, quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
154. The opinion's "question-begging inexorability" on this point places it "in the
mainstream tradition of the Court's great decisions." Karst & Horowitz, supra note 73,
at 55. The bland reference to the judicial duty to construe the law in no way supports
the conclusion that the judiciary, rather than the executive, ultimately decides when the
privilege applies. President Nixon's position was that the Constitution, properly inter-
preted, had assigned that function to him; nothing in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803), precludes judicial agreement with that view. Gunther, Judicial
Hegemony and Legislative Autonomy: The Nixon Case and the Impeachment Process,
22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 30, 33-34 (1974). There is, however, little question that a
principled resolution of the applicability of the privilege is more likely to come from the
judiciary, at least when the executive faces a serious conflict of interest. As Karst &
Horowitz conclude, "United States v. Nixon, like Marbury v. Madison, rests most
comfortably not on textual exegesis, but on a sound Hamiltonian sense of 'structure and
relationship' in a system of separated powers." Karst & Horowitz, supra note 73, at
58.
155. 418 U.S. at 713.
156. Mishkin, Great Cases and Soft Law: A Comment on United States v. Nixon, 22
U.C L.A. L. REv. 76, 84-85 (1974); Ratner, Self-Incrimination and the Separation of
Powerl.sw. 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 92, 97 (1974). The Special Prosecutor had asked
merely for a ruling that the courts could override the privilege when substantial evidence
indicated that it was shielding criminal conduct. Brief for Special Prosecutor, supra note
23, at 222. This would have closely paralleled the common law rule. See notes 104
supra & 157 infra and accompanying text.
157. See note 105 supra.
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ing the prospect of outright presidential defiance of its order, the Court
chose to rely publicly on the broader ground,158 whose overbreadth
could subsequently be corrected. A similar theory accounts for the
logical deficiencies in the Court's holding that the judiciary has the
power to decide the applicability of the privilege. 159 A fair statement of
the rule emerging from the Watergate litigation is that the judiciary has
final authority to decide the applicability of a constitutionally-based
internal discussions privilege when the President faces a conflict of
interest sufficiently great to disqualify him from making an impartial
decision.
Applying this rule to the national security provisions of the amended
FOIA poses two difficulties. First, the language in which the courts
phrased the rule looks to the plaintiff's need rather than the President's
conflict of interest.6 0 Although the grand jury's need is closely related
to the executive conflict of interest in a Watergate situation, an FOIA
plaintiff's generalized interest in information is not so related. More-
over, a general desire for knowledge of government activity, although
critical to the democratic process, is the kind of impersonal interest
traditionally disfavored by courts."" The implication is that an FOIA
plaintiff could never demonstrate need sufficient for the court to require
in camera review of information under a formal claim of executive
privilege for internal discussions.
In Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v.
Nixon,"6 2 the District of Columbia Circuit upheld a presidential asser-
tion of executive privilege against a subpoena of presidential tapes based
solely on the Senate Watergate Committee's factfinding needs. 18 The
court held that a plaintiff must demonstrate need "of the order [shown]
by the grand jury. . . before the President's obligation to respond to
the subpoena is carried forward into an obligation to submit subpoe-
naed materials to the court" for in camera inspection. 04 This ruling ira,
plied that the court cannot acquire the power to determine finally the
applicability of executive privilege until plaintiff makes the required
showing. If this reading of Senate Select Committee is correct, the rule
158. Mishkin, supra note 156, at 86-89.
159. Id. See note 154 supra.
160. See notes 135-39, 154-55 supra and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-77 (1974).
162. 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
163. Id. at 732.




is plainly illogical. A case which the judiciary lacks the constitutional
power to decide does not become justiciable merely because plaintiff's
need is great; 165 nor is an otherwise justiciable case dismissed merely
because the injury is trivial.186 Instead, the courts acquire power to de-
termine the applicability of the internal discussions privilege when
plaintiff clearly proves a disabling conflict of interest in the Presi-
dent.167 In direct contradiction to Senate Select Committee, therefore,
the test should not be "the nature and appropriateness of the function
in the performance of which the material was sought, and the degree to
which the material was necessary to its performance,"'0 8 but the "na-
ture of the presidential conduct which the subpoenaed material might
revel. "1 6 9
Plaintiff's need is relevant to the propriety of judicial exercise of
power. Absent special circumstances a presidential assertion of the
internal discussions privilege should defeat a suit for information under
the FOIA without need to examine in camera the materials sought.
When the plaintiff proves a disabling presidential conflict of interest,
however, the decision should not be automatic. In these special circum-
stances the minimal intrusion of in camera judicial review is a small
price to pay for effective operation of the FOIA.17 0
Second, the Watergate cases provide no indication of the magnitude
of the conflict of interest required to shift final decisionmaking authority
to the courts. 17  The magnitude should vary, however, depending on
165. E.g., Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970); Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp.
689 (E.D. Pa. 1972), a!ffd mem. sub nom. Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973)
(constitutionality of Vietnam war).
166. E.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
167. See text accompanying notes 159-61 supra.
168. Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d
725, 731 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
169. Id.
170. In such a case, Judge Sirica's approach in Senate Select Committee is superior to
that employed by the District of Columbia Circuit. Since the House Judiciary Commit-
tee had already received copies of the recordings for use in impeachment proceedings, the
Ervin Committee's need was minimal. Nonetheless, Judge Sirica thought the conclusory
allegations of the President's affidavit so flimsy that they merely balanced the Commit-
tee's minimal need. He ultimately resolved the issue in favor of the President solely for
fear of prejudicial publicity in the second Watergate trial. See Senate Select Comm.
on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 370 F. Supp. 521 (D.D.C.), a! 'd, 498
F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
171. If the test is, as stated, the magnitude of the plaintiff's interest, there is no real
indication of the standard against which such need must be tested. Compare Halperin v.
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the allocation of initial decisionmaking authority by the Constitution.
For confidential communications, in camera review would presumably
be appropriate if plaintiff could present a prima facie case that the
privilege was serving as a shield for crime. 172  The threshold is high
because the privilege is necessarily executive; its purpose is to protect
executive decisionmaking processes. 173  Consequently, the Constitution
implicitly assigns to the President the initial choice to invoke or waive the
privilege.
By contrast, the national security privilege is a state privilege that
directly serves the interests of the entire government. 1 4  It is the
exclusive property of the executive branch only to the extent that the
Constitution explicitly or implicitly assigns sole responsibility for nation-
al security to the executive branch. If the Constitution does not so
allocate responsibility, it does not grant solely to the President the initial
decision to invoke the privilege. Consequently, the conflict of interest
required to place final authority elsewhere is far less than that required
for the internal discussions privilege. Indeed, a functional analysis
Kissinger, 401 F. Supp. 272 (D.D.C. 1975), and Sun Oil Co. v. United States, 514 F.2d
1020 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (civil litigant's need for information outweighs formal claim of
executive privilege by former President), with Senate Select Comm. on Presidential
Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (generalized information
needs of Senate Committee insufficient to overcome formal claim of privilege by
incumbent President), and Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F. Supp. 107 (D.D.C.), staved sub
nonz. Nixon v. Richey, 513 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (formal claim of privilege by
former President insufficient to defeat FOIA suit for presidential documents).
172. Cf. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933).
173. The speech and debate clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, serves a similar function
for Congress. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972); United States v.
Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972); Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 772-73 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(Wilkey, J., dissenting). An implied "judicial privilege" doubtless protects the decision
process of the judiciary. Nixon v. Sirica, supra at 740-42 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting);
Cox, supra note 21, at 1406; Winter, Book Review, 83 YALE L.J. 1730, 1737 (1975). Cf.
Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933) (jury deliberations usually privileged from
disclosure). These privileges can be exercised initially by no other branch, because they
exist solely to protect executive, legislative, or judicial processes.
174. Obviously, the executive privilege for internal discussions also serves the public
interest by protecting the executive decisionmaking process. Only the branch whose
decision process it protects, however, can properly assess the need to assert the internal
discussions privilege in any one case; hence, only that branch can initially claim the
privilege. See notes 77-80 supra and accompanying text. The national security privilege
is different. A priori, one cannot say that only a single branch can assess the danger to
national security from release of a given bit of information. The privilege is exclusively
executive only if national security is the exclusive responsibility of the executive, a




would suggest that final authority should lie elsewhere if even a minor
conflict exists in the executive.' 75
The Watergate tapes litigation makes clear that the executive privilege
for internal discussions, although solidly based in the Constitution, may
be overcome in appropriate circumstances. Properly analyzed, both the
rule and the reason are the same: the judiciary acquires final authority
to determine the applicability of the privilege when the President is dis-
abled by a severe conflict of interest. A similar rule should apply to the
executive privilege for national security. The magnitude of the conflict
required, however, depends on whether the Constitution assigns sole
responsibility for national security to the President.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
An assessment of the constitutional merits of the amended FOIA thus
requires extended discussion of the constitutional allocation of national
security powers. If the President is solely responsible for all aspects of
national security, the Constitution must also allocate to the executive
the sole initial authority to invoke or waive the national security privi-
lege, so that it would be truly an executive privilege. On the other
hand, if the President and Congress share responsibility for national se-
curity, the authority to invoke the national security privilege would also
be shared. Consequently, a relatively small conflict of interest would
suffice to assign final authority for information classification outside the
executive branch.
The case against the constitutionality of the amended FOIA rests
on a premise and a corollary. The premise is that the executive is
solely responsible for foreign policy. The corollary is that these special
unreviewable powers over foreign relations and national defense implicit-
ly contain all domestic powers necessary to safeguard the national
security, including unreviewable power to classify information.176 Con-
sequently, Congress may not shift final authority to classify information
from the executive to the judiciary, "[nior may courts sit in camera in
order to be taken into executive confidences."'177
175. See notes 291-300 & 310 infra and accompanying text.
176. Government Secrecy: Hearings on S. 1250, S. 1276, S. 2451, S. 2738, S. 3393,
& S. 3399 Before the Subcomm. on Governmental Relations of the Senate Comm. on
Government Operations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 146-52 (1974) (testimony of Robert G.
Dixon, Jr.) [hereinafter cited as Government Secrecy Hearings].
177. Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111
(1948).
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This Section will examine both the premise and the corollary. The
conclusion is that with limited exceptions178 neither is constitutionally
sound.
A. Exclusive Presidential Authority over National Security
1. The Case for Exclusive Control
Respectable authorities have asserted that the constitutional separa-
tion of powers allocates exclusive control of American foreign relations
to the President; although Congress may share concern with military
and foreign affairs, it cannot share responsibility. 1 7  The leading case
supporting this proposition is United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp.'5 0 In Curtiss-Wright the Supreme Court upheld a presidential
order imposing an arms embargo pursuant to congressional resolution
authorizing such action in the President's discretion."8' The defendant
asserted that Congress had impermissibly delegated legislative power to
the President and that the embargo was consequently invalid.'82 The
Court rejected this assertion, on the basis that the nation's foreign af-
fairs powers had vested directly in the new government following the
Revolution.' s Consequently, the Court reasoned, presidential power
over foreign affairs "did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the
Constitution,' 1 4 but rather inhered in the office:
178. See notes 301-09 infra and accompanying text.
179. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728-30 (1971) (Stewart,
J., concurring); Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111
(1948); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936);
Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 105 (1875); Dixon, supra note 23, at 130-34;
Comment, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act, 1974 Duon LJ. 251,
258-59.
180. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
181. H.1. Res. 347, ch. 365, 48 Stat. 811 (1934). The resolution permitted an
arms embargo to those countries warring over the Chaco, territory then subject to
hostilities between Bolivia and Paraguay.
182. The Court heard Curtiss-Wright in the wake of two cases from the prior Term
construing narrowly congressional authority to delegate powers to the President: Schech-
ter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293
U.S. 388 (1935). The need to escape the restrictive delegation of powers doctrine
enunciated in these two cases accounted in large measure for the expansive language of
Curtiss-Wright. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An
Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J 1, 6-7 (1973).
183. 299 U.S. at 316-17.




[Plarticipation in the exercise of the [foreign affairs] power is signifi-
cantly limited. In this vast external realm, with its important, compli-
cated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the
power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. . . . [T]he
very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole
organ of the federal government in the field of international relations
. . . does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress....
Moreover, he, not Congress has the better opportunity of knowing the
conditions which prevail in foreign countries and especially this is true
in time of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He
has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials.
Secrecy in respect of information gathered by them may be highly neces-
sary, and the premature disclosure of it productive of harmful effects.
Indeed, so clearly is this true that the first President refused to accede
to a request to lay before the House of Representatives the instructions,
correspondence and comments relating to the negotiation of the Jay
Treaty-a refusal the wisdom of which was recognized by the House
itself and has never since been questioned.1 8 5
The second leading case supporting unreviewable presidential power
in foreign affairs is Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman
Steamship Corp. 18 6 In Waterman the Court declined to review a presi-
dentially approved award of overseas air routes, despite explicit con-
gressional authorization of judicial review.18 7 The Court offered two
rationales. First, the basis of executive action might be secret informa-
tion that should not be transmitted to the courts for review on the mer-
its.I Second, and apparently of greater importance, the political ques-
tion doctrine precluded judicial review:
But even if courts could require full disclosure, the very nature of execu-
tive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial. . . . They
are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude,
facilities nor responsibility and which has long been held to belong in
the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or in-
quiry.' 8 9
185. Id. at 319-20.
186. 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
187. Civil Aeronautics Act, ch. 601, § 1006, 52 Stat. 1024 (1938) (current version at
49 U.S.C. § 1486 (1970)).
188. Id. at 111.
189. Id. See also United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v.
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937) (upholding presidential power to recognize the Soviet
Union on whatever terms and conditions the President sees fit).
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2. The Case for Concurrent Congressional Powers
There are several reasons to discount the sweeping language in Curtiss-
Wright and Waterman as a basis for exclusive presidential authority
in foreign affairs. 19° First, neither case is directly applicable to a statute
limiting presidential power because each spoke of such power in the
context of congressional authorization. Second, both courts and com-
mentators have strongly criticized the rationale of each case, and courts
have subsequently applied the reasoning of neither. Finally, Congress
has often asserted concurrent jurisdiction over foreign affairs, a custom
suggesting that presidential powers over national security, although pre-
eminent, are not exclusive.
The first flaw in Curtiss-Wright and Waterman is that neither directly
applies to a statute like the amended FOIA. Each case considered
presidential action explicitly authorized by Congress. By contrast, the
FOIA explicitly restricts presidential authority, reducing such power to
its "lowest ebb." 19' Courts can sustain exclusive presidential power
only by holding that Congress has no constitutional role in foreign
affairs. Cases upholding executive authority when authorized by Con-
gress cannot sustain that authority when restricted by Congress.
Second, the doctrinal basis of both Curtiss-Wright and Waterman is
suspect. Although the Court has not explicitly overruled Curtiss-
Wright, later decisions have not been faithful to Justice Sutherland's
reasoning.192 Curtiss-Wright rested on the theory that the foreign af-
fairs powers vested directly in the federal government and the Presi-
dent as an attribute of sovereignty. 93 Yet the Court has since stated
flatly that the "Constitution limits the Government to those powers spe-
cifically granted or those that are necessary and proper to carry out the
specifically granted ones,"' 94 and applied this rule on several occasions
to foreign as well as domestic affairs.' 93 The Court has also held that
statutes governing the issuance of passports must meet "accepted tests"
190. See generally Dorsen & Shattuck, Executive Privilege, the Congress and the
Courts, 35 Omo ST. LJ. 1 (1974); Project, supra note 16, at 1000-06.
191. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
192. See Lofgren, supra note 182, at 5.
193. 299 U.S. at 316-17.
194. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967).
195. Id.; Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957). See generally Lofgren, supra note
182, at 5 & n.30.
[Vol. 1976:609
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1976/iss4/3
Vol. 1976:6091 EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 641
of delegation, 1 ' again implicitly denying the Curtiss-Wright theory that
foreign affairs powers are derived independently of the Constitution.
Supreme Court rulings on the jurisdiction of military courts illustrate
the implicit rejection of Curtiss-Wright. The leading case of Ex parte
Milligan 97 established in 1868 the rule that military jurisdiction does
not extend to civilians during civil war when the civilian courts are open
and functioning.19 The Court reaffirmed that basic principle in Dun-
can v. Kahananoku,'99 although the military court in that case also
enjoyed congressional sanction.20 Finally, a series of cases construing
the Uniform Code of Military Justice20' has prohibited military courts
martial of ex-servicemen for crimes committed while in the armed
forces;2 02 of civilian dependents of troops stationed overseas; 2°3 and of
servicemen for crimes unconnected with military service.2
4
196. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958).
197. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1868).
198. Id. at 127.
199. 327 U.S. 304 (1946). See also Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 401 (1932)
("What are the allowable limits of military discretion, and whether or not they have
been overstepped in a particular case, are judicial questions").
200. 327 U.S. at 324. The Court construed the statute, the Hawaiian Organic Act,
ch. 339, 31 Stat. 141 (1900), not to allow military courts to replace their civilian
counterparts, at least when the latter were open and operating.
201. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1970).
202. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
203. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
204. O'Callaghan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969). These cases considered constitu-
tional rights in connection with criminal trials, rather than the statutory right granted to
a citizen by the FOIA. In assessing the merits of the amended FOIA, however, this
distinction is irrelevant. First, there is a sound argument that the first amendment
implicitly guarantees the public a constitutional right to know. Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 1817, 1823 (1976);
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817. 832 (1974); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 569 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster
General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965);
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943); Emerson, supra note 24, at 3. But
see Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965); United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309,
1316 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972). Second, merely alleging a
constitutional violation does not confer jurisdiction on the courts. E.g., United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974); Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689, 708 (E.D. Pa.
1972), aff'd mem. sub nom. Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973). If the President
exercises absolute, unreviewable power in any sphere, courts cannot redress injuries he
imposes, Thus the Court's review of the scope of military jurisdiction strongly implies
that military and foreign affairs are not solely committed to presidential discretion.
Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 626-27 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en bane), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 944 (1976).
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These cases establish two propositions relevant to Curtiss-Wright.
First, they embody a clear rejection of its premise that the President
inherited his foreign affairs powers directly from George III, without the
need for separate constitutional authority. "The United States is entire-
ly a creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority can have no
other source. It can act only in accordance with all the limitations
imposed by the Constitution."20 5 Second, the President is not immune
from judicial review merely because he exercises power in foreign affairs
or as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Rather, unless the issue
presents a political question,2 °0 judicial review of presidential action
overseas is appropriate.
Finally, a recent assessment of the historical basis of Curtiss-Wright
has found the opinion wanting.20 7 Professor Lofgren has characterized
the treatment of precedent as "shockingly inaccurate," and concluded,
"Curtiss-Wright does not support . . .broad, independent executive
authority [in foreign affairs.] . . . It certainly invests the President
with no sweeping and independent policy role. 208
The doctrinal base of Waterman is equally suspect: 200  it illustrates
the automatic classification of foreign affairs as political questions which
Baker v. Carr210 squarely rejected.2 ' Consequently, although not ex-
plicitly overruled, Waterman's "apparently sweeping contours have
been eroded by recent Circuit Court opinions. 212 The Court's willing-
ness to review executive decisions about passports for American citi-
zens illustrates the implicit rejection of Waterman. In Kent v. Dulle, 213
205. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957); accord, Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d
594, 626-27 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1685 (1976).
206. See notes 311-59 infra and accompanying text.
207. Lofgren, supra note 182.
208. Id. at 32 (emphasis original).
209. See generally Miller, The Waterman Doctrine Revisited, 54 Guo. L.J. 5 (1965);
Comment, supra note 17, at 425.
210. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
211. Id. at 211. See also Miller, supra note 209, at 17.
212. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 392 F.2d 483, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
See also Pillai v. CAB, 485 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The Pillai court invalidated
an order approving transatlantic rate schedules; "hardly anything" in the record sup-
ported the Board's decision. The court commented:
The Board cannot wrap its decision in some mystique of foreign policy or pur-
ported expertise in international negotiation to achieve a nonreviewable status
for the facts underlying its most important and sensitive decisions.
Id. at 1023.




the Court overturned an administrative practice that denied passports to
American members of the Communist Party; the Court narrowly con-
strued the relevant statutes 214 to deny the Secretary of State power to
refuse passports on political grounds. 15 In Aptheker v. Secretary of
State, 2 18 the Court invalidated section 6 of the Subversive Activities
Control Act, 217 which prohibited granting passports to Communists, de-
spite the national security motives underlying the Act.21 8 In Zemel v.
Rusk, 219 although the Court upheld the Secretary of State's refusal to
validate passports for travel to Cuba, the reviewability of the decision
was not seriously questioned.22 1
The Court's decision to review these cases is directly contrary to the
Waterman thesis. It means not only that courts can "review and
perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly
held secret," 221 but further demonstrates that executive action in foreign
affairs is not per se immune from judicial scrutiny.
Finally, in most cases which the Court has declined to review under
the political question doctrine, it has recognized, albeit in dicta, the
concurrent powers of Congress in the area of national security. In
Oetien v. Central Leather Co.,2 " the Court found nonjusticiable a
dispute over the validity of title to property seized by the Mexican
government on the ground that "[t]he conduct of foreign relations of our
Government is committed by the Constitution to the Executive and the
Legislative .... ."..3 In United States v. Belmont,224 which upheld
presidential recognition of the Soviet Union, the Court referred to
Oetien in the following terms:
This court held that the conduct of foreign affairs was committed by
the Constitution to the political departments of the government. . . that
who is the sovereign of a territory is not a judicial question but one the
214. 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1970); 22 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1970).
215. 357 U.S. at 129-30.
216, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
217. 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1970).
218. 378 U.S. at 509-14.
219. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
220. Id. at 6-7.
221. Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111
(1948).
222. 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
223. Id. at 302 (emphasis added).
224. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
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determination of which by the political departments conclusively binds
the courts.225
Even in Waterman the Court held that "[s]uch decisions are wholly
confided by our Constitution to the political departments of the govern-
ment, Executive and Legislative. '226  This language is irreconcilable
with the notion of absolute executive autonomy in foreign affairs.227
Third, congressional action asserting power over foreign affairs is also
consistent with the theory that the President shares responsibility for
national security with the Congress. Congress has often used the power
of the purse to impose its foreign policy judgments on the executive.22 8
The special dependence of foreign aid on appropriations makes it a
special target of congressional concern,220 most recently illustrated by
the cutoffs of military aid to Turkey and to Southeast Asia.230 Were
presidential powers in foreign relations unlimited, Congress would be
restricted to a general authorization of funds, 231 leaving its distribution
entirely to the executive.
In the War Powers Resolution,282 Congress has also asserted its
determination to share in the decision to commit American troops to
combat. The Resolution requires the President to report any engage-
ment of American military forces within 48 hours, together with the
225. Id. at 328.
226. 333 U.S. at 111 (emphasis added). See also Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614 (5th
Cir. 1974).
227. Whether the judiciary can properly share such powers depends on whether the
political question doctrine precludes judicial review. See notes 311-59 infra and accom-
panying text.
228. See generally Fulbright, American Foreign Policy in the 20th Century under an
18th-Century Constitution, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 5-6 (1961); Wallace, The President's
Exclusive Foreign Affairs Powers Over Foreign Aid, 1970 DUKE L.J. 293, 493. Senator
Fulbright in 1961 lamented the absence of plenary executive power in foreign affairs; he
accurately observed that, whatever the juridical basis for the sweeping language of
Curtiss-Wright, "I do not think that it is accurate in fact." Fulbright, supra, at 3.
229. Kramer & Marcuse, Executive Privilege-A Study of the Period 1953-1960, 29
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 827, 827 (1961).
230. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2321f (Supp. 1976) (prohibiting military aid to South Vietnam,
Laos, and Thailand unless explicitly authorized by act of Congress); 22 U.S.C.A. §
2370(x) (Supp. 1976) (suspending military aid to Turkey pending a negotiated settle-
ment of the Cyprus conflict). Other illustrations of congressional authority over foreign
aid include the Hickenlooper amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (1970) (prohibiting
foreign aid to countries that nationalize American industry without just compensation);
22 U.S.C. § 2370(f) (1970) (prohibiting aid to Communist countries).
231. The general aid authorization is 22 U.S.C. § 2312 (1970).




reasons for the engagement, its constitutional and legislative authority,
and the estimated scope and duration of hostilities.2" Without explicit
congressional approval, the President must terminate the engagement
within 60 days. " 4  The Mayaguez incident-in which American troops
invaded a Cambodian island to liberate an American merchant ship-
was the first test of the War Powers Resolution. President Ford largely
complied with the letter, if not the spirit, of the statute. 85  Those
portions of the National Security Act creating the CIA and defining its
role -" are further unmistakeable indications of the concurrent power of
Congress in foreign affairs.237
That the President exercises primary authority in foreign affairs is
indisputable. There is equally little dispute, however, that Congress also
has a role that has been sanctioned by judicial interpretation and by long
usage. Consequently, in normal circumstances, 38 Congress has the
constitutional power to impose restraints on executive classification of
national security information, including a transfer of the final authority
to determine the propriety of classification.
B. Exclusive Presidential Authority over Domestic Threats to Nation-
al Security.
1. The Case for Exclusive Presidential Authority
Assuming that the President does enjoy complete autonomy in foreign
affairs, the amended FOIA is unconstitutional only if exclusive presi-
dential authority also extends to domestic action directly threatening
national security. Authority to classify information, although closely
related to foreign affairs, itself is purely domestic action. The FOIA
impermissibly invades the executive domain only if exclusive presiden-
tial power over national security implicitly includes exclusive, unre-
viewable domestic powers over all activities that directly affect national
security.
233. 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a) (Supp. IV 1974).
234. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (Supp. IV 1974).
235. See Clifford, In Praise of Congress, N.Y. Times, May 21, 1975, at 43, col. 2;
Lewis, The Laws under Which Mr. Ford Took Action, N.Y. Times, May 18, 1975, § 4,
at 2, col. 3. But see Berger, The Mayaguez Incident and the Constitution, N.Y. Times,
May 23, 1975, at 37, col. 1.
236. 50 U.S.C. §§ 403-403j (1970).
237. United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 629 (3d Cir.) (Gibbons, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 884 (1974).
238. But see notes 301-10 infra and accompanying text.
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Language in several Supreme Court opinions supports this theory.
Both Curtiss-Wright and Waterman strongly hinted that the President has
plenary power to reserve secret information from Congress20 and the
courts240 on national security grounds. Justice Stewart's concurring
opinion in the Pentagon Papers case 241 is the most complete judicial
expression of this theory:
The responsibility [for classification] must be where the power is. If
the Constitution gives the Executive a large degree of unshared power
in the conduct of foreign affairs and the maintenance of our national
defense then under the Constitution the Executive must have the largely
unshared duty to determine and preserve the degree of internal security
necessary to exercise that power successfully. . [I]t is clear to me
that it is the constitutional duty of the Executive-as a matter of sover-
eign prerogative and not as a matter of law as the courts know law-
through the promulgation and enforcement of executive regulations, to
protect the confidentiality necessary to carry out its responsibilities in
the fields of international relations and national defense.2 42
Finally, dicta in United States v., Nixon248 imply that the executive
privilege for national security information is constitutionally based, ab-
solute in scope, and unreviewable by courts or Congress. 244 The Court
noted that the privilege claimed in the tapes litigation did not rest on the
ground that the tapes contained "military or diplomatic secrets. As
to these areas of Art. II duties the courts have traditionally shown the
utmost deference to Presidental responsibilities. 245
2. The Case for Concurrent Powers
A closer examination of relevant Supreme Court precedent reveals
that whenever the issue has been directly presented the Court has
239. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
240. Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp,, 333 U.S. 103, 111
(1948).
241. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
242. Id. at 728-30 (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted). See also Govern-
ment Secrecy Hearings, supra note 176, at 146-53 (testimony of Robert G. Dixon,
Jr.).
243. 418 U.S. 683, 710-11 (1974), quoted in text accompanying note 245 infra.
244. See also Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 721 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (explicitly
exempting national defense and foreign relations material from order requiring produc-
tion of presidential tapes for in camera inspection).
245. 418 U.S. at 710-11, citing United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953), and




decisively rejected the notion of unreviewable presidential autonomy in
domestic affairs closely related to national security.240 First, the cases
supporting the theory are not reliable precedent in its favor. The
deficiencies in Curtiss-Wright and Waterman have previously been not-
ed.247 The Pentagon Papers result, properly viewed, holds that presi-
dential power independent of congressional sanction does not extend to
domestic affairs implicating national security.24 Nor is the language in
United States v. Nixon240 dispositive. First, the statement is dictum,
because military secrets were not at issue. Second, its position in the
opinion suggests that it refers to the scope of the privilege when applica-
ble rather than to judicial power to determine if it applies.2 50 Third, the
opinion elsewhere contemplates in camera review by the district court to
excise material inadmissible under Reynolds and Waterman.2 51  The
only material inadmissible under these cases is national security data; the
plain inference is that the court may examine in camera all presi-
dential documents. 52 In short, available precedent does not estab-
lish the right to "throttle judicial review by presenting a claim of
executive privilege in the cellophane wrapper of 'national security.' ,25"
Moreover, whenever it has addressed the issue directly, the Court has
flatly refused to extend presidential foreign relations powers to domestic
affairs threatening the national security. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 54 known as the Steel Seizure case, is the decision most nearly
in point. Fearing that a national steel strike in 1952 would cripple the
246. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 626 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
247. See notes 190-221 supra and accompanying text.
248. See notes 276-81 infra and accompanying text.
249, 418 U.S. 683,710-11 (1974).
250. Sections A and B of the Court's discussion of the claim of privilege established
that the judiciary has ultimate power to determine the applicability of the privilege. 418
U.S. at 703-07. The dicta concerning the national security privilege appear in Section C,
which discusses the circumstances in which the claim of privilege may be overridden. Id.
at 707-13. See Berger, supra note 74, at 787.
251. 418 U.S. at 715 n.21.
252. Berger, supra note 74, at 787. A possible explanation for the Court's apparently
contradictory view of the national security privilege lies in its desire to maximize its
apparent neutrality to minimize the prospect of presidential disobedience. See notes 156-
59 supra and accompanying text. Lip service to presidential autonomy in foreign
relations was a relatively inexpensive means to achieve such apparent neutrality. Mish-
kin, supra note 156, at 87-88.
253. Van Alstyne, A Political and Constitutional Review of United States v. Nixon,
22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 116, 117 (1974).
254. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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Korean War effort, President Truman ordered the Secretary of Com-
merce to seize the steel mills. Lacking statutory support,2se the Presi-
dent asserted his inherent executive powers and his position as com-
mander-in-chief to justify his action. The Supreme Court nullified the
seizure. Although the implications of the case have been hotly
debated,257 it is clear that a close connection between national security
and a domestic crisis does not warrant unilateral presidential action
absent either congressional consent or imminent threat of national disas-
ter.218  Justice Jackson, the author of Waterman, explained:
[N]o doctrine that the Court could promulgate would seem to me more
sinister and alarming than that a President whose conduct of foreign
affairs is so largely uncontrolled, and often even is unknown, can vastly
enlarge his mastery over the internal affairs of the country by his own
commitment of the Nation's armed forces to some foreign venture.259
The so-called "national security" wiretaps sponsored by the Nixon
Administration also clearly illustrate the absence of unbridled presiden-
tial discretion in domestic affairs that relate, however directly, to nation-
al security. The leading case is United States v. United States District
Court,26 0 in which the Government had wiretapped a defendant's tele-
phone without a warrant. The Government resisted disclosure of the
intercepts, asserting that the warrantless wire tap was constitutional
under the President's inherent power to protect national security. A
255. The Government explicitly disclaimed reliance on any of the statutory proce-
dures then in effect that allowed the Government to seize private property. 343 U.S. at
585-86. Congress' refusal to include such powers in the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. §§
141-87 (1970), implicitly rejected seizure as a means to deal with crippling strikes. The
President thus had to rely solely on his powers as chief executive and commander-in-
chief of the armed forces.
256. 343 U.S. at 589.
257. Compare Corwin, The Steel Seizure Case: A Judicial Brick Without Straw, 53
CoLuM. L. Rnv. 53, 65-66 (1953) (approving result, but criticizing shallowness of
analysis), and Kauper, The Steel Seizure Case: Congress, the President and the Supreme
Court, 51 MICH. L. REv. 141, 177-82 (1952) (approving both result and reasoning),
with Hutton, Usurpation of Political Power, 57 DICm. L. Rv. 179, 184-87 (1953)
(questioning propriety of judicial review in Steel Seizure case).
258. See notes 301-10 infra and accompanying text.
259. 343 U.S. at 642 (Jackson, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). One might argue
that national security classification is more closely related to the foreign affairs and
military powers of the President than is the production of steel. Two comments are in
order. First, it is hard to imagine anything more directly connected to the military
power than the industrial base on which it rests. Second, the notion that the President's
domestic powers can be confined to those which are "directly connected" to his national
security powers is fraught with peril. See notes 291-99 infra and accompanying text.




unanimous Court rejected this contention and held that the President
must protect internal security in accordance with the fourth amendment
requirement of prior judicial authorization of searches and seizures.26'
The Court's treatment of the issue of judicial competence is of particular
relevance to the amended FOIA:
We cannot accept the Government's argument that internal security
matters are too subtle and complex for judicial evaluation. Courts
regularly deal with the most difficult issues of our society. There is no
reason to believe that federal judges will be insensitive to or uncompre-
hending of the issues involved in domestic security cases. . . . If the
threat is too subtle or complex for our senior law enforcement officials
to convey its significance to a court, one may question whether there
is probable cause for surveillance. Nor do we believe that prior judicial
review will fracture the secrecy essential to official intelligence gather-
ing. The investigation of criminal activity has long involved imparting
sensitive information to judicial officers who have respected the con-
fidentialities involved. Judges may be counted upon to be especially
conscious of security requirements in national security cases ...
Moreover, a warrant application involves no public or adversary pro-
ceedings: it is an ex parte request before a magistrate or judge. What-
ever security dangers clerical and secretarial personnel may pose can be
minimized by proper administrative measures, possibly to the point of
allowing the Government itself to provide the necessary clerical assist-
ance.26 2
Two recent circuit court decisions26 3 have applied this rationale in
subjecting to judicial review executive authority to wiretap in national
security cases. In Zweibon v. Mitchell '64 sixteen members of the Jewish
Defense League (JDL) sought damages from former Attorney General
John Mitchell for a warrantless wiretap of their headquarters. 65 The
261. Id. at 321.
262. Id. at 320-21.
263. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 944 (1976), discussed in text accompanying notes 264-67 infra; United States
v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974), discussed in
text accompanying notes 268-71 infra.
264. 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en bane), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
265. The JDL is a militant Zionist organization with a history of strong anti-Soviet
actions, both legal and illegal. Some of these actions had allegedly caused serious
frictions in Soviet-American relations. Id. at 608-09 nn.21-24. Of primary concern
were the plainly illegal bombings of Soviet trade and airline offices in New York City, in
response to which the President feared retaliation against American citizens in Moscow.
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defense was that former President Nixon had explicitly authorized the
intercepts. In holding the defendants liable, the District of Columbia
Circuit decisively rejected the notion that the foreign affairs powers
established "the inherent authority of the President to engage in war-
rantless national security surveillances as a necessary concomitant of his
responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Chief
Executive of the nation."'26 6 Instead, the court ruled:
This brief survey of the types of cases which have acknowledged ...
the vast scope of Executive power in the domain of foreign relations
should clarify any misconception that they render that power exempt
from judicial review or immune to constitutional limitations. Indeed,
there is another series of cases which graphically establishes the limits
on presidential power when national security is used as a talisman to
invoke extraordinary powers in the conduct of domestic affairs.20 7
In United States v. Butenko,2 8 the Third Circuit considered presiden-
tial power to wiretap the American embassy of a foreign power.2 9 The
The Soviet objections also extended to conduct clearly protected by the first amendment,
such as picketing the home of the Soviet ambassador. Id. at 608 n.23.
The President ordered the wiretaps to protect American citizens in the Soviet Union,
preserve Soviet-American relations, and "obtain foreign intelligence information deemed
essential to the security of the United States." Affidavit of Attorney General, quoted In
id. at 607. The legal basis of the wiretaps was asserted to be the "authority relating to
the nation's foreign affairs." Id.
266. 516 F.2d at 615. Although the court split sharply on several damage related
issues, there was unanimity that the wiretaps were illegal. Two judges thought the
intercepts violated the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-
20 (1970). 516 F.2d at 681 (McGowan, I., concurring); id. at 688 (Robb, J.,
concurring). The remaining judges thought the wiretaps violated the fourth amendment.
Id. at 614 (plurality opinion); id. at 689 (Wilkey, I., concurring and dissenting); id. at
706 (MacKinnon, J., concurring and dissenting). All judges agreed that the national
security rationale did not confer plenary power on the President to wiretap domestic
organizations without prior judicial sanction.
267. 516 F.2d at 626, citing New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971), see notes 276-81 infra and accompanying text; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 578 (1952), see notes 254-59 supra and accompanying text; Duncan
v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946), see notes 199-200 supra and accompanying text;
Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1868), see notes 197-98 supra and accompany-
ing text.
268. 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974).
269. Butenko was accused of being a Russian spy. After his first conviction, the
Government confessed that it had overheard Butenko's conversations through wiretaps on
various Soviet installations in the United States. On appeal, the Supreme Court held
that copies of all illegal wiretaps must be disclosed and remanded the case for a decision
on the legality of the warrantless wiretaps. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165
(1969). The Government declined to release any of the intercepts, asserting that the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1976/iss4/3
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court granted substantial latitude to presidential discretion but retained
the authority to review the propriety of its exercise. The court unani-
mously agreed that "the Fourth Amendment is also applicable where, as
here, the President is acting pursuant to his foreign affairs duties even
though the object of the surveillance is not a domestic political organiza-
tion."2 ' The court split sharply on the need for prior judicial review in
all instances. The majority permitted a warrantless tap if it were other-
wise reasonable and Congress had not prohibited it,27 ' but emphasized
that post-search judicial review would test the reasonability of the
wiretap and that the in camera inspection conducted by the trial judge
was a proper method to ensure legality.272 Butenko does stand for
substantial presidential discretion in foreign affairs, 73 but does not
support unreviewable presidential discretion in direct defiance of con-
gressional action. On the contrary, Butenko subjects presidential action
to protect internal security to judicial review; the final authority on the
legality of the wiretaps remains with the judiciary.7 4 The national
security wiretap cases thus support the basic principle that the Constitu-
tion does not grant autonomy to the President in domestic matters
directly related to the national security. 7 5
Finally, cases considering the first amendment and foreign policy
further support this principle. Although Justice Stewart's concurring
President's national security powers allowed warrantless wiretaps of agents of foreign
governments in the United States. A majority of the Third Circuit sustained this
position. 494 F.2d at 608.
270. 494 F.2d at 603.
271. The Butenko majority held that the Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §
605 (1970), did not ban warrantless wiretaps of the agents of foreign governments.
Noting that such a prohibition would raise constitutional questions, the majority declined
to discuss the outcome. 494 F.2d at 601.
272. 494 F.2d at 606-07.
273. The absence of prior judicial review is clearly inconsistent with the fourth
amendment. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315-18
(1972). Moreover, the potential for abuse of such power is great, United States v.
Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 628 (3d Cir.) (Gibbons, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
881 (1974). Butenko is probably inconsistent with the reasoning of Zweibon v.
Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976),
and grants immense latitude to presidential action to protect the national security.
Nonetheless, even this ruling stretching presidential power to its outermost limits
retains subsequent judicial review of the legality of such action. See note 272 supra and
accompanying text.
274. 494 F.2d at 603-06.
275. See also United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 1013 (1975); United States v. Ehrlichman, 376.F. Supp. 29, 33-34 (D.D.C. 1974)
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opinion in the Pentagon Papers case suggests complete executive au-
tonomy in national security classification, 27 6 the result requires a con-
trary conclusion. The Court refused to enjoin the New York Times
from publishing the complete text of the 47-volume history of American
intervention in Vietnam, despite the President's claim that release of
these "Top Secret" documents would cause incalculable harm to the
national security.2 77  The Court was well aware that this decision
limited the President's domestic authority implicitly derived from the
foreign relations power;2 78 Justice Harlan's dissent on the merits was
bottomed on this precise issue.2 79  But a majority of the Court held that
the first amendment required, at minimum, proof of direct, immediate
and irreparable injury to warrant injunction, 8 ° and the judiciary, not
the executive, was the final arbiter of whether that burden had been
fulfilled.2 8 1
(flat rejection of defendants' claims that President may authorize domestic burglary to
protect national security). But see United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (good faith reliance on apparent authority of government agent to authorize
illegal action, if objectively reasonable, negates intent to violate law).
276. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728-30 (1971) (Stewart,
J., concurring), quoted in text accompanying note 242 supra.
277. 403 U.S. at 714.
278. See Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689, 711 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (Lord, C.J.,
dissenting), aird mem. sub nom. Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973). An
exception must be made for Justice Stewart, who thought that the responsibility for
classification was exclusively executive. Consequently, the duty to safeguard secret
documents was also exclusively executive. Absent some congressional action, or proof of
immediate and irreparable injury, the executive had to act alone. 403 U.S. at 728-30
(Stewart, J., concurring).
279. 403 U.S. at 756-58 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
280. 403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring).
281. For two, perhaps three, of the Justices, the absence of congressional sanction for
the President's action was decisive of the merits. 403 U.S. at 732 (White, J., concur-
ring); id. at 741-47 (Marshall, J., concurring):
It would, however, be utterly inconsistent with the concept of separations of
powers for this Court to use its power of contempt to prevent behavior that
Congress has specifically declined to prohibit.
Id. at 742 (Marshall, J., concurring). Although Justice Douglas would probably have
reached the same result in any event, he too was troubled by the lack of congressional
authorization. Id. at 720-22 (Douglas, J., concurring).
See also Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 992 (1975); United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denled, 409
U.S. 1063 (1972). Both cases dealt with ex-agent Victor Marchetti's attempt to publish
a book highly critical of the CIA. See V. MAnCHETr & J. MAReS, THE CIA AND THE
CuLT oF INTELLIGENCE (1974). Marchetti had signed an agreement not to release
classified material, which the Agency sought to enforce in the courts. In each case, the
court enjoined publication of classified material. In Colby the court did assume final
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1976/iss4/3
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These three lines of cases establish that, although the national
security powers imply some executive authority to act domestically, such
authority is not independent of congressional and judicial scrutiny.
Consequently, the Congress may exercise concurrent powers in classify-
ing information.
Custom and usage confirm Congress' role in information classifica-
tion.*-' 2  Although the present security classification system was estab-
lished by executive order,28 3 Congress could amend or replace the
system.84  The congressional role in applying sanctions to violations of
the executive secrecy system is even clearer. Congress has prohibited
acquisition and disclosure of classified information with intent or reason
to believe that it will injure the United States or aid a foreign govern-
ment. 2s Knowing or willful publication of classified material relating
to communications intelligence is likewise illegal,2"6 as is the release of
atomic secrets with intent to injure the United States or assist a foreign
government.21s Congress has prohibited transmission of national secur-
ity information to Communists,8 8 but has to date refused to enact a
comprehensive Official Secrets Act despite strong pressure from the
executive.-" The most recent assertion of congressional authority over
executive information is the resolution on executive agreements, which
authority to determine the propriety of classification, relying on the 1974 FOIA
amendments. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, supra at 1367. The court then limited
the depth of its review by invoking a general presumption that executive officials act
properly in performing their duties, thus limiting the Agency's proof to the fact of
classification and some reasonable relationship between the classified documents and the
national security. Id. at 1368-69. That presumption is erroneous in the context of
national security classifications. See note 29 supra. The case illustrates clearly,
however, the judicial reluctance to overturn executive classifications. For critical
reviews of the Colby decision, see Comment, Freedom of Information: Judicial Review
of Executii e Sccurity Classifications, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 551, 561-65 (1976); Note,
supra note 9, at 416-19.
282. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 743-47 (1971)
(Marshall, J., concurring); Project, supra note 16, at 1003-06.
283. Exec. Order No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1974), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401, at
1429 (Supp. II 1972).
284. Project, supra note 16, at 1006.
285. 18 U.S.C. §§ 793-94 (1970).
286. 18 U.S.C. § 798 (1970).
287. 42 U.S.C. § 2274 (1970).
288. 50 U.S.C. § 783(b) (1970).
289. E.g,, 12 WEEKLY COMP. OF PREs. Doc. 243 (1976). The President's request for
such legislation itself suggests that Congress has concurrent powers in classifying
information.
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requires the President to transmit to Congress the text of all such
agreements to which the United States is a party. 290
Finally, compelling functional arguments demand rejection of un-
limited presidential authority in national security classifications. Abso-
lute power in any single branch was foreign to the intent of the Founding
Fathers; rather, they hoped to provide each branch with the constitu-
tional means and personal motives to resist encroachment by the
others.291 Power was divided within the Government to prevent tyr-
anny by a single branch, not to provide a series of "watertight compart-
ments" in which any branch enjoyed complete autonomy.29 2 A rule
whose constitutional foundation was a grant of plenary power to the
President in all domestic affairs related to national security would lay
the foundation for complete executive tyranny. 2 3 The concept of na-
tional security has elastic bounds, easily stretched to expand presiden-
tial power.29 4 Moreover, the attempt to limit such unreviewable power
to domestic activity "directly related" to the national security would al-
most surely prove fruitless. The Court's unavailing struggle to limit fed-
eral legislation to commerce "directly affecting" interstate commerce 0 5
has given way to an expansive construction of the commerce clause,
which today justifies federal legislation on civil rights,290 riots,2 9 7 racke-
teering,2 8 and white slavery.299 Limiting presidential power to activity
which "directly relates" to national security limits it not at all.
290. 1 U.S.C. § 112b (Supp. IV 1974).
291. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (A. Hamilton).
292. Cf. Comment, supra note 58, at 1467 (power divided to ensure independence of
each branch).
293. United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 628 (3d Cir.) (Gibbons, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974); Developments in the Law-The National Security
Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1130, 1219 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
National Security Developments].
294. See Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 635-36 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en bane),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 924 (1976).
295. Compare NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), with
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
296. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (1970). See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)
(sustaining on commerce clause grounds the 1964 Civil Rights Act).
297. 18 U.S.C. § 2101 (1970).
298. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1970). See United States v. Compton, 365 F.2d 1, 3 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 956 (1966); Marshall v. United States, 355 F.2d 999, 1004
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 815 (1966) (sustaining Travel Act on commerce clause
grounds).




Separation of powers therefore does not preclude and may require
judicial review of presidential action in domestic national security
cases' 00 The argument for unreviewable presidential authority over
information classification presumes presidential autonomy in all domes-
tic activities which directly affect the national security. The Court
has firmly rejected any such proposition in several lines of cases. Con-
gress does have a role, albeit subordinate, in the classification of national
security information. Consequently, in normal circumstances, it is
erroneous to assert that the President has sole power to classify national
security information.
C. The National Emergency Exception
In times of national emergency, the Constitution permits a narrow
exception to the general rule that the President shares national security
powers with Congress. Unless Congress has specified precise measures
to cope with the specific emergency in question, the President may act
without congressional approval, or even in the face of prior congres-
sional disapproval, for a limited period during "the gravest imminent
danger to the public safety."' 3 1' In such times
[i]f a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is
not only authorized but bound to resist force by force. He does not
initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting
for any special legislative authority. . . . The President was bound
to meet [the emergency] in the shape it presented itself, without waiting
for Congress to baptize it with a name.302
During the emergency immediate action may be crucial to the survival
of the nation; the executive is necessarily better suited than the legis-
lature to respond with the requisite dispatch.30 3  A true national
(1946); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913) (sustaining Mann Act on commerce
clause grounds).
300. National Security Developments, supra note 293, at 1219.
301. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944). Accord, Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 662 (1952) (Clark, J., concurring) ("the
Constitution does grant to the President extensive authority in times of grave and
imperative national emergency"); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (military power to
try spies in wartime); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863) (President decides
when civil war cxists and what measures are appropriate to counter it). See generally E.
CoRWIN, TOTAL WAR AND THE CoNSITrUTIoN (1947).
302. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668-69 (1863).
303. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 629 (1952) (Douglas,
J., concurring); M. ARNOLD, C. GARViN & G. RosENBAUM, supra note 19, at 282.
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emergency thus confers plenary power for both foreign and domestic
affairs on the only immediately responsive officer, the President. 0'
It follows that the President may claim a national security privilege,
notwithstanding the amended FOIA, during the period in which he
may legitimately assume extraconstitutional powers.
The exception is strictly limited to true national emergencies. Only
when the public danger is "immediate, imminent and impending!'301
can the President assume the extraconstitutional powers necessary to
save the nation. Otherwise the exception would swallow the rule,
and the President could act at his whim without congressional au-
thorization, in direct violation of the principle of separation of powers.
The appropriate test to determine the existence of such an emergency
in the context of the FOIA should be closely akin to that suggested in
the Pentagon Papers case for prior restraint-a national emergency
that "will surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage
to our nation or its people." 06
The President's extraconstitutional powers terminate, not when the
emergency ends, but when Congress again can legislate concerning the
emergency.. 07  These powers derive not from the emergency alone but
from the executive's comparative speed in responding to crisis.808 When
Congress is again able to act, the rationale for the exception dissolves,
and the President must act in accord with congressional will. Congress
may often ratify the President's actions or grant him new authority
for the duration of the emergency.300 Subsequent presidential action
is taken pursuant to the duty to execute the laws made by Congress,
not pursuant to the extraconstitutional emergency powers. Applied
304. Cf. E. CoRwiN, supra note 301, at 19-20 (Civil War was first but not last
assertion of presidential initiative to meet domestic aspects of war emergency).
305. United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 623, 628 (1871).
306. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 730 (1971) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
307. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 660 (1952) (Burton, J.,
concurring) ("The controlling fact here is that Congress, within its constitutionally
delegated power, has prescribed for the President specific procedures, exclusive of
seizure, for his use in meeting the present type of emergency"); id. at 662 (Clark, J.,
concurring) (President may act at will in crisis, unless Congress had specified the path
to follow in such a crisis). See E. CORwiN, supra note 301, at 19.
308. See notes 302-03 supra and accompanying text.
309. See, e.g., Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23 (codified at
50 App. U.S.C. §§ 901-46, repealed 1947). The Supreme Court upheld the constitution-
ality of the Emergency Price Control Act and its administrative procedures in Bowles v.




to the FOIA, the emergency exception permits the President to claim
the national security privilege only until Congress has an opportunity
to amend the statute. If Congress declines to act, the President's legiti-
mate claim to privilege disappears.
Except during national emergencies when Congress cannot act, then,
the amended FOIA trespasses on no exclusively executive preroga-
tives. The President is not solely responsible for either the conduct of
American foreign policy or domestic affairs directly related to foreign
affairs, but shares responsibility with Congress. Consequently, the Presi-
dent cannot claim a constitutionally based executive privilege for na-
tional security information, except during a national emergency. The
privilege is not an executive privilege but a state privilege. The Consti-
tution thus permits either the President or Congress to specify the
conditions in which it may be waived. In assigning final responsibility
for classifying information elsewhere than the executive branch, Con-
gress acted in accord with the principle of separation of powers. In-
deed, given the inherent conflict of interest in executive decisions on
classification,"" ° the amended FOIA conforms more closely to the
principle of separation of powers than did the original FOIA.
V. THE POLITICAL QuEsTIoN DOCTRINE
The conclusion that the President lacks exclusive authority to classify
national security information does not necessarily make the judiciary an
appropriate participant in national security classifications. Courts
traditionally refrain from passing judgment on political questions-
issues explicitly assigned to other parts of the federal government or
which the judiciary lacks the competence to resolve."1' Decisions
relating to foreign affairs have often been described as classic political
questions."' 2
Some authorities have asserted that national security information
classification is such a nonjusticiable political question.313 A review
310. See notes 29-31 supra and accompanying text.
311. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
312. E.g., Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970); Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc.
v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324
(1937); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); Oetjen v.
Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); Curran v. Laird, 420 F.2d 122 (D.C. Cir.
1969); Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972), affd mem. sub nom. Atlee v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973).
313. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728-30 (1971) (Stewart,
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of the purposes of the political question doctrine in light of the criteria
developed in Baker v. Carr3 14 justifies a contrary conclusion in most
instances. Except for information received in confidence from foreign
governments, 1 5 the judiciary has the ability to review the propriety
of classification. With that exception the amended FOIA presents
no political questions disqualifying the judiciary from a final decision
on the merits of classification.
The judiciary declines to decide political questions either because
it lacks the capacity for rational decisions or because our system of
government leaves the decision to officials directly responsible to the
people.816 The doctrine rests on a wise recognition that enforcement
of judicial pronouncements depends on the respect accorded them by
the other branches of the federal government and by the people.1 7
Thus the Court refrains from deciding cases in which there is found
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent re-
solution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches
of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one ques-
tion.818
Three of these criteria, are relevant to the amended FOIA.
First, there is no "textually demonstrable . . . commitment of the
issue to a coordinate" branch. Even the strongest critics of the amended
FOIA concede that the national security privilege is implicit in the
President's foreign affairs powers, rather than explicitly granted by the
Constitution.3"' The current classification order, Executive Order
J., concurring); id. at 757-58 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v.
Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948); Government Secrecy Hearings, supra
note 176, at 152 (testimony of Robert G. Dixon, Jr.).
314. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
315. See notes 346-54 infra and accompanying text.
316. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1962).
317. See 1d. at 296-97 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); A. BICKEL, Tim LEAST DAN-
GEROUS BRANCH 184 (1962).
318. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
319. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 756 (Harlan, J., dissent-




11,652,320 rests on no more specific a claim of authority than "the
authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United
States .... ,,321
Moreover, the Court has construed the textually demonstrable com-
mitment doctrine narrowly.3 2 2  In Powell v. McCormack,3 23 the Court
reached the merits of a Congressman's suit for back pay after the
House of Representatives refused to seat him, despite the constitutional
provision making each house the "Judge of the Elections, Returns and
Qualifications of its own Members ..... 324 The Court thought this
"at most a 'textually demonstrable commitment' to Congress to judge
only the qualifications expressly set forth in the Constitution. 325
This narrow construction of the doctrine strongly suggests that the
implied presidential privilege for national security information is not
a "textually demonstrable . . .commitment" depriving the courts of
power to review information classification.
The Court's treatment of the speech and debate clause, the only
explicit constitutional privilege, further supports this thesis. The speech
and debate clause prohibits questioning a Congressman or Senator
"[for any Speech or Debate in either House ... ."213 In United
States v. Gravel,32 7 the Court held a Senator's aide not privileged from
testifying at the behest of a grand jury investigating the theft of the
Pentagon Papers; the clause did not extend to matters unrelated to
the legislative process.328 In United States v. Brewster,29 the Court
held that a Senator accused of taking a bribe could not seek refuge
in the speech and debate clause, which did not protect criminal con-
duct merely because it related to the legislative process.3 80  In each
case the dissents dealt solely with the merits; the political question doc-
trine was not raised. While the scope of the clause has been generously
320. Exec. Order No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1974), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401, at
1429 (Supp. II 1972).
321. Id.
322. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), noted in The Supreme Court,
1968 Term, 83 HAv. L. REV. 7, 62-77 (1969).
323. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
324. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
325. 395 U.S. at 548.
326. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6.
327. 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
328. Id. at 624-25.
329. 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
330. Id. at 520-21.
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interpreted, 31 "legislative privilege" pursuant to an explicit constitu-
tional requirement is unquestionably a fit subject for judicial review.
The inference is plain that the textually demonstrable commitment
doctrine does not preclude judicial review of the implicit executive
privilege for national security information.
The second requirement, "judicially discoverable and manageable
standards," poses more serious questions of judicial competence. Fed-
eral judges are not experts in foreign relations; courts and commen-
tators are concerned that the judiciary might unwittingly release highly
sensitive information. 33 2  The Fourth Circuit's attitude, illustrated in
United States v. Marchetti, 33 is typical:
There is a practical reason for avoidance of judicial review of secrecy
classifications. The significance of one item of information may fre-
quently depend upon knowledge of many other items of information.
What may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great moment
to one who has a broad view of the scene and may put the questioned
item of information in its proper context. The courts, of course, are
ill-equipped to become sufficiently steeped in foreign intelligence mat-
ters to serve effectively in the review of secrecy classifications in that
area.
334
An erroneous decision to release properly classified information poses
a twofold danger. The obvious threat is use by foreign powers inimical
to the United States. Less obvious but no less serious is the injury
sustained by the judiciary, which, lacking political responsibility for
national security, nonetheless overrules the judgment of experts to
whom that duty has been explicitly entrusted.33a
A closer analysis of the judicial role under the amended FOIA,
however, suggests that such concerns are misplaced. Criteria for the
331. See Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975).
332. United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1318 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1063 (1972); Curran v. Laird, 420 F.2d 122 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Wolfe v. Froehlke,
358 F. Supp. 1318, 1320 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd, 510 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (per
curiam); Dixon, supra note 23, at 130; Henkin, Commentary, The Right to Know and
the Duty to Withhold: The Case of the Pentagon Papers, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 271, 279
(1971). This concern was the principal reason for President Ford's veto of the 1974
amendments: "As the legislation now stands, a determination by the Secretary of
Defense that disclosure of a document would endanger our national security would, even
though reasonable, have to be overturned by a district judge who thought the plaintiff's
position just as reasonable." 10 WEEKLY COMP. OF PREs. Doc. 1318, 1318 (1974).
333. 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
334. Id. at 1318.
335. See note 317 supra.
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need for secrecy do exist, developed by the President himself. 36
Executive Order 11,652 provides explicit tests for classifying informa-
tion. 7  The FOIA incorporates these tests in the first exemption,
which excludes material properly classified "under criteria established
by an Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of national de-
fense or foreign policy. ' 338 These constitute judicially manageable
standards."': 9
Moreover, the review process itself aids in the task of avoiding error.
Courts do not initially classify material, but review a decision reached by
experts to determine whether it conforms to established criteria. This is
similar to the review of any administrative action, in which courts
"regularly deal with the most complex issues of our society."340 The
336. Additional legislation may thus be necessary to reduce abuses in the classifica-
tion system. Material is "confidential" if its "unauthorized disclosure could reasonably
be expected to cause damage to the national security." Exec. Order No. 11,652, 3
C.F.R. 339, 340 (1974), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401, at 1429 (Supp. II 1972). The
diligent bureaucrat bent on secrecy will have little difficulty in constructing some injury
to national security that might "reasonably be expected" if the subpoenaed material were
disclosed. See Dorsen & Shattuck, supra note 190, at 5 n.18; Nesson, supra note 19, at
404; Note, supra note 9, at 411-16.
337. The test for assigning "Top Secret" classification shall be whether its unau-
thorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave
damage to the national security. . . . The test for assigning "Secret" classifi-
cation shall be whether its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be ex-
pected to cause serious damage to the national security. . . . The test for as-
signing "'Confidential" classification shall be whether its unauthorized dis-
closure could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national security.
Exec. Order No. 11.652, 3 C.F.R. 339, 340 (1974), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401, at
1429 (Supp. 11 1972).
338. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1974).
339. Comment, supra note 17, at 430; Comment, supra note 58, at 1464.
340. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 320 (1972). See
also International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 641, 647-48 (D.C. Cir.
1973 ); National Security Developments, supra note 293, at 1225.
Courts usually review administrative action under a "substantial evidence" test. Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act § 10-e, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (E) (1970). The issue in these
cases is whether the agency's decision is supported by "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate . . . ," Brasher v. Celebrezze, 340 F.2d 413,
414 (8th Cir. 1965), and the court "is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that
of the agency." Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416
(1971). In FOIA suits, however, the court must conduct a trial de novo and enter its
own judgment on the merits of classification. See notes 56-59 supra and accompanying
text.
This distinction does not convert an otherwise justiciable case into a political question.
The expertise necessary to discover "substantial evidence" in favor of an agency's
decision is no less than that required to assess the merits of classification de novo. Cf.
International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, supra at 641 (court's diffidence in reaching
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impartial judgment of the court, in contrast to the bias of the execu-
tive,"4 more than compensates for "any marginal lack of expertise. '3 42
To paraphrase Justice Powell's discussion in United States District
Court, "[i]f the threat is too subtle or complex for our senior [security
experts] to convey its significance to a court, one may question whether
there is probable cause for [classification]. 3 43  Finally, judicial re-
view under the FOIA is similar to review of an evidentiary privilege in
litigation, and Reynolds and its progeny establish the propriety of
judicial review in such cases.344
The third criterion of Baker v. Carr8 45 relevant to national security
classification is the prospect of "embarrassment from multifarious pro-
merits "rooted in the underlying technical complexities" and "remains even when we take
into account that ours is a judicial review, and not a technical or policy redetermina-
tion"). Moreover, de novo review of agency action, while unusual, is not unique to the
FOIA. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, supra at 414 (de novo
review authorized in reviewing adjudication based on inadequate factfinding, or when
new issues appear in judicial proceeding to enforce nonadjudicatory action); Russ v.
Southern Ry. Co., 334 F.2d 224, 227 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 991 (1965)
(money awards of National Railroad Adjustment Board reviewed de novo); John J.
Trombetta Co. v. Goldstein & Procacci, 198 F. Supp. 288, 290 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (awards
by Secretary of Agriculture under Perishable Agricultural Commodites Act, 7 U.S.C. §
499(b) (4) (1970), reviewed de novo).
341. See notes 29-31 supra and accompanying text.
342. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en bane), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Comment, supra note 58, at 1473. It is unlikely that the
initial decision reflects any broad view of foreign policy, given the thousands of lower
level bureaucrats with classification authority. It is even less likely that the original
classifier is better informed than the court at the conclusion of an in camera inspection,
supplemented with the affidavits and testimony of top level executive officers. See
Comment, supra note 58, at 1469-70.
- 343. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 320 (1972). Accord,
Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 944 (1976):
We simply do not believe that any margin of expertise possessed by the Attor-
ney General can compensate for the neutral and detached attitude that a judge
would bring to his decision; given the likely deference that a judge will accord
the Attorney General's request, there is no substantial likelihood that any mar-
ginal lack of expertise will result in denial of legitimate requests for a warrant
and frustration of proper intelligence gathering on the part of the Executive.
Since the judiciary must grant substantial weight to the agency's affidavit, see note 57
supra and accompanying text, these comments about national security wiretapping are
relevant to national security classification.
344. See notes 67-100 supra and accompanying text. The force of this argument is
significantly diluted by the common law requirement that the court must allow the
privilege once it is clear that state secrets are implicated. Under Reynolds, unlike the
FOIA, the court may not balance the need for secrecy against the need of the party
subpoenaing the records. See notes 101-02 supra and accompanying text.
345. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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nouncements" from different branches of the government. This ele-
ment of the political question doctrine derives from the Government's
need to present a united front when dealing with foreign governments.
As the nation's designated representative to foreign countries, the Presi-
dent assumes powers in such dealings necessarily exempt from subse-
quent judicial review. 46 The leading case is Doe v. Braden,347 in which
the Court declined to consider whether a foreign government had prop-
erly ratified a treaty with the United States:
[I]t would be impossible for the executive department of the govern-
ment to conduct our foreign relations with any advantage to the country,
and fulfil the duties which the Constitution has imposed upon it, if every
court in the country was authorized to inquire and decide whether the
person who ratified the treaty on behalf of a foreign nation had the
power, by its Constitution and laws, to make the engagements into which
he entered.348
The problem of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements is
irrelevant to most national security data;349 the Government as a whole
is not usually embarrassed by a court reversal of an executive classifica-
tion decision. When the President or his representatives have acquired
documents from a foreign government under a pledge of secrecy, how-
ever, the courts cannot order their release, 30 for the entire Government
would suffer if an independent judiciary could subsequently overrule the
executive's solemn promise of secrecy. Diplomatic negotiations would
founder; exchanges with foreign governments would decline. Conse-
quently, the political question doctrine denies the judiciary the power to
release such information, a conclusion implicit in the District of Colum-
bia Circuit's opinion in Wolfe v. Froehlke.3 5'
There remains the question of the proper judicial role when the claim
of privilege rests on confidential communications received from a for-
eign government. The procedures employed to evaluate the common
law state secrets privilege seem analogous. Under United States v.
346. Id. at 211-12; Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635 (1853).
347. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635 (1853).
348. Id. at 657.
349. Dorsen & Shattuck, supra note 190, at 37 n.129.
350. The Freedom of Information Act: Hearings on H.R. 5425 & H.R. 4960 Before
the Subcomm. on Foreign Operotions and Government Information of the House Comm.
on Government Operations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 137 (1973) (testimony of Robert G.
Dixon, Jr.).
351. 510 F.2d 654, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1974), aff'g 358 F. Supp. 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
See note 34 supra.
Vol. 1976:609] 663
Washington University Open Scholarship
664 WASHINTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
Reynolds,352 the courts may employ any means necessary, including in
camera inspection, to ensure that the subpoenaed documents contain
state secrets.353  Once the court is "ultimately satisfied that military
secrets are at stake," it must allow the privilege without addressing the
issue whether secrecy is desirable. 5 4  A similar procedure is appropri-
ate for information received in confidence from foreign governments
and sought by a citizen under the FOIA.
A final observation about the political question doctrine is
relevant: the long-term role of the judiciary in enforcing the FOIA is
entirely consistent with the underlying goals of the doctrine. Political
questions are by definition those issues better left to the ballot box than
to judicial resolution.3 55  The "political branches," the executive and
legislature, being directly elected by the people, more accurately reflect
the popular will than do appointed judges. As the court in Atlee v.
Laird35 6 observed, "One critical line of legal thought from Thayer
through Holmes, from Brandeis through Frankfurter, has urged that
courts serve democracy best by leaving the principal issues confronting
the citizenry to the political branches of the government. '35 7  In review-
ing executive decisions to conceal information from the electorate, the
judiciary improves the democratic process by enlarging the information
base on which it rests.358 An uninformed electorate means a less
accountable Government. By releasing improperly classified informa-
tion, the courts make possible informed choice on the great foreign
policy issues of the day, restore presidential accountability to the elector-
ate, and reduce the likelihood of ill-considered action by the President.
A rule grounded in democratic accountability should not block judicial
action that improves accountability.359
352. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
353. See notes 89-97 supra and accompanying text.
354. See notes 101-02 supra and accompanying text.
355. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 270 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
356. 347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972), affd mem. sub nora. Atlee v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 911 (1973).
357. Id. at 707.
358. See Karst & Horowitz, supra note 73, at 59; notes 17-19 supra and accompany-
ing text.
359. Professor Winter has challenged this view on the ground that "'How much
secrecy?' is the people's business and vie should not discourage their attention to that
business by acting as though a final and infallible decision is available in the courts."
Winter, Book Review, 83 YALE L.J. 1730, 1740 (1974). In short, he believes that
the political process will itself correct abuses of secrecy because the President remains
accountable at the ballot box.
This analysis overlooks political reality. In theory, all presidents are committed to
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In sum, the political question doctrine does not preclude judicial
review of national security classifications except for documents received
in confidence from foreign governments. When the court is satisfied
that the subpoenaed information was so received, it must allow the claim
of privilege. In all other cases, however, the courts are competent to
assess the merits of classification in accord with the standards of Execu-
tive Order 11,652. With a single exception, therefore, the amended
FOIA presents no political questions inappropriate for judicial resolu-
tion.
VI. CONCLUSION
Fifteen days after its decision in Curtiss-Wright laid the foundation for
the sweeping claim of executive privilege in foreign affairs, the Supreme
Court had occasion to discuss the importance of informed public debate.
In DeJonge v. Oregon,360 Chief Justice Hughes wrote of the necessity
for "free political discussion, to the end that government may be respon-
sive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be
obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic,
the very foundation of constitutional government." ' That prescription
is no less valid when applied to foreign policy.362
open government and minimal secrecy. In practice, however, the institutional bias
inherent to the executive branch, see notes 29-31 supra and accompanying text, tips the
balance in favor of secrecy. Viewed in this light, the amended FOIA bears a striking
resemblance to the original reapportionment case, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
In theory, the fair-minded people of Tennessee could have elected representatives pledged
to reapportion the state's archaic legislative districts, in theory, the legislators themselves
could have voted to reapportion the state. In practice, however, the residents of the
rotten boroughs could hardly be expected to vote away their advantages; nor could
legislators reasonably be expected to vote themselves out of office. Absent a referendum
or initiative, there was no political redress possible for the underrepresented majorities in
the cities, Although only Justice Clark mentioned it explicitly, id. at 258-59 (Clark, J.,
concurring), the breakdown in the political process was probably a significant factor in
the majority's decision to hear the case on the merits. Similarly, one cannot expect the
executive branch of its own accord to weigh impartially the public need for information
against its own need for secrecy; the inherent institutional bias prevents a fair balancing.
Although the conflict of interest is probably less than that faced by the Tennessee
legislature, it is sufficiently great to prevent resolution of the secrecy problem through
the political process.
360. 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
361. Id. at 365.
362. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 719 (1971) (Black, J.,
concurring).
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The 1974 amendments to the FOIA offer the hope of improved
public discussion and understanding of America's foreign policy. The
decision to classify information is inevitably delicate. The executive
branch is inherently biased, however, in favor of secrecy, for secrecy
serves the parochial interests of the executive bureaucracy, rather than
the nation's broader needs. Yet in the long run, if error must occur,
erroneous disclosure is better for democracy than erroneous secrecy. A
functional analysis of the classification process dictates that the execu-
tive not make the final decision about the propriety of classification.
The implied executive privilege for national security information is
consistent with this conclusion. Although the President has primary
responsibility for foreign policy, his power is neither absolute nor unre-
viewable; except in time of national emergency, Congress shares these
powers. Consequently, the national security privilege is properly a state
privilege rather than an executive privilege, and Congress can constitu-
tionally determine when it may be waived. The law is clear that the
President cannot disobey statutory or constitutional commands in exe-
cuting domestic functions, such as national security classification, direct-
ly related to foreign policy. Congress thus has constitutional authority
to remove the final decision on national security classifications from the
executive branch.
Assuming that Congress or the President define the circumstances in
which classification is appropriate, the judiciary is a proper repository of
the final authority to classify, except for documents received in confi-
dence from foreign governments. Although judges are not experts in
foreign policy, their expertise in administrative review, when enlightened
by the executive branch, should permit proper decisions about the
propriety of classification.
No one questions the need for secrecy in foreign affairs. A final
executive determination of when it is appropriate, however, leads only to
abuse of the Top Secret stamp. Such abuse always threatens the
accountability of the Government to the electorate; ultimately it destroys
the ability to retain even those secrets that should remain secret. More
active judicial involvement in the classification process, through intelli-
gent interpretation and use of the amended FOIA, may permit more
rational and more democratic decisions about America's role in world
affairs.
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